Military and Society in Israel and Japan:
Family Support, Mental Health and Public Support

Coedited by
Eyal Ben-Ari and Hitoshi Kawano
Military and Society in Israel and Japan: 
Family Support, Mental Health and Public Support

Coedited by

Eyal Ben-Ari and Hitoshi Kawano

March 2020

Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy
Yokosuka, Japan
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Eyal Ben-Ari and Hitoshi Kawano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micky Aharonson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel 2019: A Practitioner’s Strategic Overview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eitan Shamir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF Doctrine in the 21st Century: Change and Adaptation in face of New Strategic Realities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yagil Levy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties and Israeli Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyal Ben-Ari</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Discourses and the Military in Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ofra Ben Ishai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAMDA: Areas of Responsibility, Structure and Changes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitoshi Kawano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Support and Gender Policy in the Japan Self-Defense Forces: A Case Study of JGSDF Families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMINAR PROGRAM</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTRIBUTORS</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Global Security Seminar Series is published occasionally by the Center for Global Security. The Center designs series of international seminars and other independent seminars. This series consists of the working papers of these seminars. The views expressed in this publication are solely of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions or governments of the authors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank all of the presenters and participants in the seminar, including Saya Kiba, Associate Professor, Department of Intercultural Communication, Komatsu University; Masao Yogo, Specified Research Professor, Faculty of Psychology, Director of Affective Sciences, Harris Science Research Institute, Doshisha University; Keiko Ito, Project Lecturer, Center for Research on Counseling and Support Services, University of Tokyo; Masanori Nagamine, Professor and Colonel, GSDF, Division of Behavioral Science, National Defense Medical College; and Christopher Udell, LCDR, U.S. Marine Corps.

We would also like to thank Hideya Kurata, Director of Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy, for hosting the Global Security Seminar. We also deeply appreciate editorial assistance provided by Teruhiko Fukushima, Head of Division of Planning and Publication, Center for Global Security, National Defense Academy, for publication of this seminar report.

Finally, we would like to thank Shutaro Sano, LTC, GSDF, for his lecture on Japan’s national defense policy, Takashi Terada, MAJ, GSDF, Yuki Ohta, LCDR, MSDF, and Shin’ichi Hirao, 1st LT, GSDF, for offering assistance and providing a campus tour of NDA.

Eyal Ben-Ari
Kinneret Center on Peace, Security and Society in Memory of Dan Shomron

Hitoshi Kawano
National Defense Academy
Introduction

This collection deals with two rather different kinds of armed forces. On the one hand is the Israel Defence Force (IDF) established in 1948 when the country became independent. On the other hand, are the Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) that were established in 1954 due to the advent of the Cold War and American pressure. While the IDF has participated in six major wars, numerous large operations and thousands of small skirmishes and engagements, the JSDF has been involved primarily in peace-keeping efforts and providing support during natural disasters, besides a major mission of national defense. And, whereas the IDF is a conscript military with a very large reserve force, the JSDF is an all-volunteer force that has a relatively small number of reservists.

Given the ongoing “security renaissance” in Japan, for the sake of “enlightenment” and mutual understanding in military affairs and some issues pertaining to the civil-military relations focusing mainly on the case of Israel, the Center for Global Security hosted a Global Security Seminar, “Military and Society in Israel and Japan: family support, mental health and public support,” on October 5, 2018, at National Defense Academy, Yokosuka, Japan.

In this introduction to this volume, we sketch out the background of the IDF and SDF and provide a short summary of each chapter.

THE ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES AND SOCIETY

Israel is probably the extreme example - South Korea and Taiwan are arguably similar to it - of a democratic country that exists within a permanent conflict, within a "war with no
end”. Unlike other countries that have moved towards all-volunteer forces Israel has continued to maintain conscription. In addition, the IDF is seen as holding special place in society and ideas about the importance of military service and security are prevalent among large parts of the population. Indeed, even today, the IDF is seen as the social institution awarded the highest trust; even higher than other institutions such as the Supreme Court, media or government. As a consequence, the IDF has been provided with a host of material and symbolic resources, and has managed to retain high-quality personnel in its regular component and reserve force.

At the end of the 20th Century a number of key developments began to emerge that have changed perceptions and expectations of the IDF: the continued military occupation of Palestinian territories and political changes, new values in Israeli society, and new demands stemming from the expansion of neo-Liberal ideas. These three changes represent challenges for the transformation of the IDF.

Since the end of the Cold War, threats to Israel’s security have been accumulating and changing. With the weakening of many Arab states and the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, the key development is the emergence of a hybrid mix of (limited) conventional, unconventional (nuclear) and sub-conventional threats supported and coordinated directly or indirectly by Iran. Hacohen suggestively calls this situation a long-term, multi-arena conflict centered on a “war” of attrition against Israel. These circumstances have led to the strategic idea that while Israel could militarily overthrow the political rulers in Gaza (Hamas), invade southern Lebanon (dominated by Hizballah), or destroy large parts of Syria’s military infrastructure, efforts should be made to manage conflicts, to keep them below the threshold of war. This policy is justified by political reasons (the need for internal and external legitimacy) and the fear of more radical groups potentially taking over in territories bordering Israel (Islamic Jihad in Gaza for example). Deterrence is to be achieved both by making enemies feel vulnerable by robbing them of their ability to continue to arm themselves with impunity, and causing suffering and fear among the civilian population so that they may put pressure on their leaders to end hostilities.

2 Gershon Hacohen, Multi-Arena Attrition: The New Existential Threat to Israel, BESA Perspectives, Number 1277. Begin-Sadat Center, Bar-Ilan University, 2019. https://besacentral.org/he/perspective-papershe/%D7%94%D7%AA%D7%A9%D7%94-%D7%AA%D7%91-%D7%97%D7%96%D7%99%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%AA/.
3 Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “Mowing the Grass’: Israel’s Strategy for Protracted Intractable
Probably the most serious threats to Israel are the over hundred thousand rockets and missiles situated in Lebanon, Gaza and Syria some of which have been developed with precision systems. More recently Israel’s enemies have begun wielding substantial numbers of drones with both intelligence and offensive capabilities. This arsenal menaces Israel's military targets and national infrastructure. The second kind of threat are commando units that can penetrate Israel in tunnels, via the air or overland to attack towns and villages near its borders in order to sow fear and to possibly kidnap soldiers and civilians that could be used in negotiations over the release of political prisoners or to obtain other concessions. Further, time is set aside for the IDF to prepare for a major war if it does eventuate. These aims of decreasing the enemies’ urgency to react with escalatory responses are achieved by extending offensive actions over time to allow them to "cool off" or undertaking actions covertly to provide attacked enemies with "deniability space” hence reducing their political motivation to strike back\(^4\).

As a consequence of these developments, almost all aspects of the IDF’s structure, planning and operations have been transformed. The military has reduced personnel, closed a large proportion of its armored forces and some air force squadrons and considerably downsized logistics units. At the same time, the number of special forces, intelligence soldiers and infantry has gone up and new capabilities such as drone units, anti-missile battalions and cyber formations have been introduced and significantly expanded. The IDF has emerged as a military of special, sophisticated units with many commandos and elite forces supported by a thin layer of armor.

These changes have been started out of a combination of factors: changed threats to the country and the conflicts it is engaged in, economic pressure and social change centered on new values and expectations of how the IDF puts its soldiers at risk. In other words, the transformation of the IDF is not only the outcome of transformed security environments but also the result of changing political, economic and social circumstances.

Social and political changes. The military occupation of Palestinian occupied territories is a task that professional militaries are not keen on since it forces them to provide services for civilians and constantly undertake missions of pacification, that is, preventing anti-occupation activities. These tasks are very different from the classic functions of the military - deterring potential enemies and preparing for and winning wars - so that military commanders assume them only for lack of alternatives. Yet, during the past decades the Occupation is something that has become increasingly disputed politically and the IDF has been forced time and again to publicly justify its activities.

Economic changes. The IDF was always successful in obtaining budgets and using them with little public monitoring. Today, with the advent of a neo-Liberal economic and social regime things have changed. For the past three or so decades, the Ministry of the Treasury, the State Comptroller, as well as the media have become vocal in criticizing the size of the IDF a, the way it utilizes its budget, the manner it uses personnel and lack of accountability in comparison with other government offices. As a consequence of the pressure these actors have brought to bear, a number of public committees were established to examine how the IDF allocates and uses its budgets. Again more widely, these developments signal increasing demands for greater financial accountability and that the IDF utilize its considerable resources in an effective and efficient manner.

Changing values. While neo-Liberal values and modes of action are most evident in the economic realm, they have also had an enormous impact on the culture of Israelis. Since the mid-1980s the country has seen greater emphasis on individual choice, competitiveness, and economic and material success as measures of success. The emphasis on individualism, in turn, implies that more than in the past there is a changed attitude towards authority including senior commanders of the IDF. The most important developments in this respect are demands for casualty aversion and the open and complete justification for the sacrifices soldiers are asked to undertake.

This process, in turn, has been intensified by the increasing mediatization of critical coverage of the IDF and its judicialization whereby specific cases are brought to the courts against the army and its commanders. All of this means that IDF is much more

7 Nahman Shai, Media War, Tel Aviv: Yediot Publishers, 2013 (Hebrew).
visible to external actors, must enter into negotiations with Israeli society (for example over conditions of service or willingness to be recruited) and that the attitude towards the military is much more conditional than in the past. These changes are important for the IDF since any action it undertakes - and especially in regard to major transformations - must take into account how it maintains its legitimacy and autonomy in order to assure continued public support, the willingness of high-quality personnel to be recruited to elite units, and to ensure that it can obtain the resources needed for it to continue to function effectively.

Now we turn to outline a number of key changes in the IDF. In general, the governing principle is the significant reduction of any unnecessary resources and the direction of these resources into expanding and developing new capabilities. This principle thus also answers demands that the IDF use the resources at its disposal in a much more efficient manner. Reductions in personnel have occurred in regard to the three major components of the IDF: conscripts, regulars and the reserves. In effect, the IDF has moved over the years to a softer form of compulsory service based on selective conscription and creation of different mixes of conscript service in which any extension of service is compensated with salary commensurate to the civilian market place. This situation is an outcome of the fact that the IDF does not really need all of the conscripts it mobilizes but wants conscription to continue in order to assure that high-quality personnel are recruited. Next, beginning in the 2010s the IDF has fired thousands of regulars (mostly officers and a small number of NCOs) in order to slim down the force and to show their acceptance of external criticisms about waste of personnel. And finally, a new reserve law enacted in 2008 lays the groundwork for the generation and training of the reserve forces and their utilization in operational missions and war. A new plan instituted in 2015 includes discharging 100,000 reservists and establishing new brigades for routine security measures comprised of conscripts and regulars so that even more reservists can be let go.

The reduction in these numbers is related to such decisions as cutting down artillery and light infantry brigades, cutting down the territorial commands by about six per cent, reducing systems which are not at the core of the IDF (like the Education Corps, Military

---

Rabbinate, Chief Reserve Officer, the chief of staff’s Advisor on Women’s Affairs, Army Radio and the Military Censor) and cutting back on major-general positions. Operationally this downsizing is also linked to the phasing out of older tank units and squadrons of warplanes and the personnel belonging to them. The IDF is now envisaged as participating in short yet intense engagements with guerrilla and terrorist organizations in urban areas. In addition, a depth command has been set up to carry out long-range operations in other counties, the number of which has steadily risen in recent years.

In addition, today, intelligence is crucial since so much of operational matters center on it with thousands of soldiers working around the clock. During the past few years, a special cyber intelligence division has also been established in which many resources have been. In communications the IDF has created and widened its internal network so that close contact between the arms and services is facilitated. The Israeli air force also looks very different today compared with a few years ago. While it has downsized the number of fighter aircraft and logistics, it has nevertheless significantly increased its capabilities. Today's capabilities allow the air force only one day of fighting to carry out the same number of bombing sorties and target handling that were generated throughout the entire Yom Kippur War.

Although envisaged to be relatively short-term, the missile and rocket attacks can potentially be difficult for the country's civilian population. Thus, in 1992 the Home Front Command was created and spread all over the country (divided into units down to the level of municipalities). It provides emergency services aimed at both the general and specific populations (such as the elderly or the bedridden). With about ten-thousand missiles foreseen to fall on the country's civilian centers this Command has taken on special importance and thus its constituent units have been bolstered, new units such as search and rescue established, and the integration of the military and local government services have been much improved. Finally, over the past decade the military has invested huge sums in acquiring a variety of drones, including ones slated for intelligence gathering (some able to fly as far as Iran) and attack vehicles. In addition, the IDF has purchased new satellites and developed satellite-based communications systems making irrelevant the limitations of previous systems.

THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES AND SOCIETY IN JAPAN

In Japan, the relationship between the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and society has changed significantly over the last three decades due to the end of the Cold War, and the changing
security situation surrounding Japan. New security challenges in the post-Cold War era include international terrorism, North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile development, and China’s increased military presence in Asia. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes ever severer, the roles of the SDF have been redefined and expanded. In late 1991, after the Gulf War, the International Peace Cooperation Law was adopted by the Diet, and took effect in June, 1992. The law ushered in the new era of the SDF personnel working as UN peacekeepers. For the first time in its history, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) personnel are to be sent overseas as an operational unit in order to take part in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) operation in 1992. Following the UNTAC mission in 1992-93, the SDF also participated in other UN peacekeeping operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ: 1992-93), and in 1996, the Japanese contingent joined the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on Golan Heights, the Israeli-Syrian border. Unfortunately, the longest-running peacekeeping operation by the SDF ended in 2013 with the withdrawal of the 34th Contingent to UNDOF. Other international cooperation activities by the GSDF troops include the UN peacekeeping operations in East Timor, South Sudan, Haiti, as well as humanitarian assistance missions in Rwanda and Iraq.

In addition, SDF took part in numerous international disaster relief operations since 1992, including those in Honduras, Turkey, India, Iran, Thailand, Indonesia, Russia, Pakistan, Philippines, Haiti, Nepal, New Zealand and Australia.

Latest development of the GSDF role expansion is a new mission to join the Headquarters of Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. Since April 2019, 2 GSDF personnel are working at the HQ of MFO on the mission of the Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty supervision as a part of “Internationally Coordinated Operation for Peace and Security,” which made possible by the amendments to the International Peace Cooperation Law in 2015. This mission marks Japan’s first participation in an international peace operation.

---

11 The 43-man Japanese Contingent consists of mostly GSDF personnel, as well as some MSDF and ASDF personnel. Major part of the Japanese transportation unit stationed at Camp Ziouani in Israel, while a small detachment section stayed in Camp Faouar in Syria. In 2013, however, Japan pulled out of the UNDOF mission, which was the longest UN peacekeeping operation by JSDF lasted for 17 years, due to the spillover of violence from the Syrian civil war.
12 Japan has financially contributed to the MFO since 1988.
that is not under the UN control.

After the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. in 2001, the role expansion of the SDF has taken further steps “toward a more flexible, joint, and responsive force.” The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law allowed the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships to engage in refueling operations in Indian Ocean, while the Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq allowed GSDF to conduct its humanitarian assistance operation in Iraq in 2004-06. It was the first overseas non-UN peacekeeping operation by GSDF. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) planes also supported the GSDF troops by providing air transportation. Although the Iraq operations by GSDF and ASDF were over a decade ago, MSDF ships are still engaging in anti-piracy operations in the Middle East with a new forward operational base in Djibouti. Having joined the multinational naval anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, MSDF has so far provided 4 two-star admirals as the Commander of Combined Task Force 151, on anti-piracy mission, since 2015. Having engaged in operations in the Middle East and the East and South China Seas, the role of MSDF has expanded, to the point of being “overstretched,” MSDF has reduced the number of vessels in the Middle East since 2016.

Other pivotal social events were the two major earthquakes that hit Japan in 1995 and 2011. The 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake destroyed the Kobe area and more than 6,400 people lost their lives. The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, took the lives of almost 20,000 people. The worst natural disaster in Japan since the end of WWII called for the largest ever disaster relief operation by the SDF, mobilizing 100,000 troops. In both cases of national emergency, the significant role of the SDF in disaster relief operations is underscored, and as a result, the public image of the SDF has improved to the highest level. According to the latest opinion poll, the SDF is the most publicly

---


14 It was, in fact, a significant moment in the history of SDF when Rear Admiral Ito, MSDF, took the command of a multinational force “for the first time ever” on May 31, 2015. MSDF has deployed two destroyers and two P-3C reconnaissance airplanes off the Horn of Africa since 2009. In February, 2020, Rear Admiral Ishimaki was appointed as the 4th MSDF Commander of CTF151. https://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2015/06/02/japan-makes-history-as-it-takes-the-lead-of-combined-task-force-151/.
trusted institution in Japan, followed by medical institution and police. In terms of the Japan-Israeli relations, it should be noted that the Israeli military personnel, NGO workers and scholars took part in international efforts to cope with the natural disasters and subsequent humanitarian crises in both cases.

In June 1995, five months after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, two Israeli psychologists, Dr. Reuven Gal and his wife, Ivria Gal, along with a guest lecturer of an American psychiatrist, Dr. Robert J. Lifton, were invited to conduct a 7-day workshop for the Japanese clinical psychologists and other medical and healthcare professionals dealing with the issues of post-traumatic stress management. At the workshop organized by Kwansei Gakuin University, Dr. Gal, a former Chief Psychologist in Israel Defense Force, and then Director of Carmel Institute for Social Studies in Israel, introduced an Israel-based coping style (BASIC-Ph) model and several stress management techniques including the Critical Incident Stress Debriefing and Scribble Therapy to the Japanese participants. The long-lasting impact of the workshop on the Japanese audience resulted in further research projects on mother-child stress coping research and developing family coping model of traumatic stress.

In March 2011, reacting to the heartbreaking news of the largest ever earthquake that devastated Japan, many countries and NGOs offered support. IsraAID, an Israel-based international NGO and humanitarian aid agency established in 2001, was one of the first foreign responders to work in Japan. The Israeli search-and-rescue team arrived 4 days later on humanitarian relief mission. By the end of March, a group of officers from the Israeli Home Front Command and the IDF’s Medical Corps were providing medical

---


supplies and care for the tsunami survivors in Miyagi Prefecture. IsraAID has been in Japan since 2011, continue to provide critical post-trauma capacity-building, psychological and mental health support. In 2013, IsraAID established JISP (Japan IsraAID Support Program), with funding from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to keep offering humanitarian aid in response to natural disaster not only in Japan but also on a global scale\(^\text{19}\).

In addition, the security policy and institutional innovations under the second Abe government (2012—present) include the establishment of the National Security Council (2013), which published the National Security Strategy for the first time in post-W.W.II Japan; dissolution of the Operations and Planning Division of Internal Bureau, MoD, in order to improve \textit{effectiveness} of operational planning by Joint Staff; and creation of Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency for a more \textit{efficient} use of resources in procurement of equipment and logistic items, while revising the arms export principles by allowing certain defense equipment and technology. As for the organizational \textit{control} system of the SDF, the support function of the Chiefs of each service Staff on military matters was enhanced, while the support by the civilian bureaucrats of the Internal Bureau was limited to policy matters in 2015, which renders the support for the Minister of Defense “in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a cart” from a policy expert and military expert perspectives\(^\text{20}\). More importantly, a symbolic security policy innovation was the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2015, which technically allowed limited use of force for collective self-defense\(^\text{21}\). At the same time, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation was revised in April, 2015\(^\text{22}\).

In March 2018, Ground Component Command (GCC) was established to unify the five regional GSDF commands, and thereby, improve effectiveness of operations with other


\(^{21}\)In response to “survival-threatening situation,” Japan’s use of force is permitted under the “three new conditions” for self-defense, which included a new condition, “when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” Ministry of Defense, \textit{Defense of Japan 2016}, p. 213.

SDF commands and/or the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Under the direct command of GCC, for the first time in GSDF history, a marine unit, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, was activated in Kyushu to be engaged in counter-invasion operations in the East China Sea. As the concepts of the defense force have evolved from the “Dynamic Defense Force” (2010 National Defense Program Guideline: NDPG) to “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” (2013 NDPG), and further to “Multi-Domain Defense Force” (2018 NDPG), which “organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies.”

In an age of “force in operation” after the Cold War, SDF is seeking to be a more effective and efficient military organization capable of dealing with a wide variety of operations along with the US and other international forces under the current policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” with the National Security Strategy. In other words, 21st century Japan is going through decades of “security renaissance” as an astute observer describes. However, the historical process of acquiring a new security identity would not proceed without difficulties and “friction” in the Clausewitzian sense. The three major issues in the civil-military relations, control, effectiveness, and efficiency, are all on the table for debate in the current “security renaissance” in Japan, besides the issue of legitimacy.

Balancing the “Peace Constitution,” prevalent post-war pacifism, and the societal imperative of “protection from the military,” with the increasing need for “protection by the military,” which is the functional imperative for national security, deriving from the current security environment surrounding Japan, “the civil-military problematique continues, and the public debate will go on for the foreseeable future.

**The Chapters**

The following chapters are based on presentations made at the seminar.

---

In Chapter 1, “Israel 2019 – a practitioner’s strategic overview,” Micky Aharonson summarizes the changing nature of threats and security challenges Israel is facing in the last decade, and presents an overview of Israeli strategic posture in the Middle East in dealing with different types of contingencies from a pragmatic perspective.

In Chapter 2, “IDF Doctrine in the 21st Century: Change and Adaptation in face of New Strategic Realities,” Eitan Shamir describes the historical process of formation and development of IDF doctrine, and examines the factors in driving these changes, in particular, focusing on strategic environment, technology development and social change. Issues and challenges regarding the newly developed strategic doctrine are also discussed.

In Chapter 3, “Casualties and Israeli Society,” Yagil Levy takes on the issue of military death, by examining different forms of public discourse regarding war casualties, how the casualties are legitimized, and what made them socially acceptable, while describing the emergence of casualty sensitivity syndrome in the 1970s and 1980s, and further elaborating on multiple policy impacts of casualty sensitivity.

In Chapter 4, “Psychological Discourses and the Military in Israel,” Eyal Ben-Ari examines the three psychological discourses in constructing understandings of war and military service in Israel: developmental, therapeutic, and organizational-psychological. He argues that these discourses work to incorporate notions about war and service into the “normal” routines of social life.

In Chapter 5, “MAMDA: Areas of Responsibility, Structure and Changes,” Ofra Ben Ishai introduces the unique nature of MAMDA, the Human Behavioral Science Department in the IDF, which is an intra-military unit with distinct characteristics compared to the other militaries. As a former Head of MAMDA, an extensive overview of the organizational structure, areas of responsibility and institutional development is presented.

In Chapter 6, “Family Support and Gender Policy in the Japan Self-Defense Forces: A Case Study of JGSDF Families,” Hitoshi Kawano examines the historical development of family support programs in the GSDF, and shares some survey and interview results of the research project on GSDF families conducted in 2015, mainly focusing on perceived family support needs, issues of trust and self-efficacy, and perceived effectiveness of the family support programs.
CHAPTER 1

ISRAEL 2019: A PRACTITIONER’S STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

Micky Aharonson

Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

INTRODUCTION

In 2018, the State of Israel celebrated its 70th anniversary. Israel is a developed and an OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) country, yet the service in the Israeli Defense Forces (the IDF) is still mandatory both for men and women. Since it was established, the country has taken part in eight wars and numerous armed conflicts and military operations, mainly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the nature of threats and security challenges Israel is facing today is quite different from those of previous decades. These threats and challenges also involve significant opportunities for Israel in the Middle East.

THREATS AND CHALLENGES

Currently, the main strategic process in the Middle East involves competition for supremacy between different factions. These are Shiite and Sunni Islam, states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and mainly Iran) and non-state actors like the Islamic State (IS) and Hezbollah. In addition, external powers like Russia play a growing role in the region, while the US is weakening its presence in the Middle Eastern arena. This state of affairs presents both challenges and opportunities to Israeli and its allies.
The threat posed to Israel by the sizeable conventional Arab armies in the past is hardly relevant anymore. Syria’s Assad has been busy trying to regain control and has rebuilt his country from the ruins. Iraq, insofar as it can be viewed as a unitary state, has other challenges to deal with instead of threatening Israel. Egypt cooperates with Israel, in particular in the Sinai Peninsula, while confronting the common threat of terrorists operating in the name of radical Islam such as IS. Other radical movements, such as the Muslim brotherhood, are very much present throughout the Middle East. In Egypt, when the Muslim brothers won the elections and governed in the years 2011-2012, there was a significant concern in Israel that the new Egyptian regime would abandon the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979. Since the A Sisi regime came to power in 2013, this concern has become irrelevant, at least for the time being.

The Egyptian leadership also shares Israeli concerns regarding Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip to the south of Israel. The approach of Hamas since it took over in 2006, and its ideological hostility towards Israel, is reflected both in actions and in statements. These have led to years of isolation of Gaza bringing Gaza’s Palestinian inhabitants to an existence constantly on the brink of humanitarian disaster.

Gaza is very different from the other Palestinian entity, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. In addition to the major economic gaps between the impoverished Gaza and the relatively well-off Palestinian Authority, there are also critical ideological differences between the two Palestinian entities. Governed by Fatah, the Palestinian Authority cooperates with Israel on security issues, which contributes greatly, even critically, to the security of the Authority and to its ability to handle internal terror and security challenges posed by Hamas and other radical Islamic factions.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is increasingly seen as a challenge that must be contained, rather than as an insurmountable hurdle to Israel’s acceptance in the Middle East. Israel has contacts with other regional players and with Muslim countries around the world. Recently the Israeli PM paid historical visits to Oman and Chad that officially have no diplomatic relations with Israel. Israel’s economic achievements and status as an OECD country, along with its warm relations with Washington, make it an attractive international partner.
The Arab and Muslim street still holds Israel responsible for the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet the leadership in the area increasingly perceives the hardships they have experienced since the uprisings commonly known as "the Arab Spring", as having very little, or nothing at all, to do with Israel.

One of the most prominent examples of this understanding is the position of Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia. Last year, the Prince made an unprecedented statement about the rights of the Jewish people in Israel and the growing fatigue with the Palestinian ongoing refusal to accept any offer for settling the conflict. Nevertheless, the Palestinian issue remains on the popular agenda in Arab and Muslim countries. While the heads of these states are more open minded towards cooperation with Israel on different levels, full-fledged diplomatic relations still depend on progress towards the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

When the US government declared its intention to open an embassy in Jerusalem last year, there were grave concerns that doing so would trigger popular violence around the world. However, except for few demonstrations in some capitals and a violent protest on the Gaza border, the opening of the embassy passed with no major repercussions. This was a clear indication that even the issue of Jerusalem, which was always portrayed as the one of the most sensitive in the list of unresolved issues between Israel and the Palestinians, is no longer perceived as existential for the Muslim and the Arab masses. Moreover, the "Arab Spring" uprisings that started in Tunisia in 2010 and spread to Egypt, Syria, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, involved high level of violence and many casualties. This demonstrated to the Palestinians in the West Bank the tragic outcome of such uprisings in the region that are far worse than the unresolved conflict with Israel. Despite the stalemate with Israel, the Palestinian leadership in the Palestinian Authority has chosen to follow a path of non-violence against Israel. It has chosen to operate mainly by encouraging boycotts in international fora such as the United Nations Human Rights Council where Israel is singled out for criticism. The ongoing condemnation of Israel by this body, while ignoring atrocities performed against minorities in the region, has not succeeded in forming a meaningful international front against Israel. Votes in international fora such as the UN are almost always against Israel. Gradually, African and other non-Western countries that traditionally have voted against Israel now support
it or at least, abstain from condemning it. One reason is Israel's intense MASHAV activity (the equivalent of Japan's JICA) to assist in medicine, agriculture, disasters relief (as after the tragedy in Fukushima) and other fields.

The main threat to Israel today is Iran and its proxies. Iran has repeatedly threatened to annihilate Israel while pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. As long as Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, the threat to Israel remains conventional and not existential. Iran continues to develop its military capacities, including a fully independent ability to produce and launch missiles, while managing to obtain access to advanced technologies. Simultaneously, Iran aspires for regional dominance and operates intensively to develop proxies, clients and terror cells throughout the Middle East. All these are united in opposition to the United States, which the Ayatollahs refer to as the great Satan, and Israel, which is referred to as the little Satan.

In the Middle East, Iran's long presence in Lebanon is manifested in its cooperation with Hezbollah, which possesses an arsenal of missiles and rockets equivalent to those of sovereign, well equipped, states. Iran is also involved in the bloodshed in Yemen by arming the Houthis and providing them with financial support. It is also very deeply entrenched in Iraq and in Syria.

To the north of Israel, Iran makes use of Syrian infrastructure and land in order to arm Hezbollah and launch terror attacks against Israel. Recently a major terrorist infrastructure was revealed by Israel which was aimed at creating a front on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. The Iranians also use Syria for weapons transfers from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran's geopolitical goal is to create a permanent and continuous military presence from Iran, through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. Assad's regime in Syria owes a great deal to Iran for its help recapturing the majority of Syria's territory from the different rebel groups. This, and the weariness of his army after eight long and blood-stained years of internal war, would make it difficult for him to resist Iranian military presence in Syria. This is despite the destabilizing effects of this presence, stemming from the open, active hostility between Iran and Israel and the repeated Iranian declarations about destroying Israel.
Israel openly declared that it will not act against Assad's regime in Syria- it never supported officially the rebellion against Assad, which is Sunni in majority and hostile towards Israel. For Israel, the lack of a central, clear sovereign authority in Syria means a vacuum that is filled, in the Syrian case, by a mish mash of dozens of terror organizations and movements such as IS, therefore making it much harder to deal with any aggression towards Israel originating in Syria.

As opposed to the Assad regime, Israel publicly declared it will oppose any Iranian military presence in Syria and will act against it. Accordingly, Israel carried out numerous attacks in Syria against Iranian military targets and weapons transfers into Syria, while adhering to the principle of not harming assets critical to Assad's rule and control of Syria.

This goal, Assad's survival, is the second most important issue for Russia, the first being Russian equipment and personnel. Israel must take into account Russian priorities in Syria because of Russia's presence and role in the Middle East. In recent years, Russia has been regaining strength in the region while the US has been playing a less dominant role. Russia's return to the region, or more precisely, re-emergence as a super power since it never really left, make it highly relevant to Israel's national security. Beyond Russia's internal reasons for expanding its presence in the Middle East, this re-emergence has been made possible due to the fact that the US, the leading power in the region for decades, has been pulling back from most fronts. The reduced commitment of the Obama administration to the region was exemplified by its reluctance to act after Assad crossed America's declared red line concerning the use of chemical weapon during the battles in Syria. The Trump administration followed suit by declaring its intent to withdraw American soldiers from Syria (and Afghanistan). The US is Israel's strategic ally, and support for Israel in the US remains bi-partisan and likely to continue regardless of the party of the next administration.

At the same time, the Russian presence in Syria includes permanent military and naval air bases (Tartus and Hmeimim). Russia's evident interest in other international issues relevant to Israel, make it a highly important player in the region in Israel's perception. Russia's relations with Iran, its interest in playing a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its dominant role in Syria, are key factors in its relations with Israel. In Syria, Russia
is not generally opposed to Israeli interests or aspirations, as long as these don’t project negatively on its key goal in the country, which is stabilizing Assad's regime. To that end, Russia cooperates with Iran in Syria and finds itself having to work both with Israel and with Iran, who are enemies, in the same region. Despite Iran's importance to Russia on various issues, in particular its support for the Assad regime in recent years, it must take into consideration Israeli interests because of Israel's capacity to harm major assets of Assad and Syria more generally.

Russia and Israel established a de-confliction mechanism based on an agreement between the highest political and military echelons. The "hotline" between the two countries is used for notifying Russia about an expected Israeli activity in Syria. Israel provides Russia with early warning before it operates in Syria against Iranian targets so that Russian personnel and equipment are left unharmed. This, however, forces constraints on Israel as Israel aspires to prevent the Iranians from strengthening their positions in Syria.

Last year, Syrian forces shot down a Russian airplane while trying to shoot down an Israeli aircraft. Russia blamed Israel for the tragic outcome because of Israeli aircraft operating too closely to the Russian airplane without proper coordination with Russia. The Russians claimed a tighter coordination and alertness on Israel's part could have prevented the tragic incident. Israel claimed it provided enough warning. For a few months Israeli-Russian relations were strained, casting doubt on future Israeli military activity against Iran in Syria. Russia declared it was sending Syria a sophisticated air defense system that would as a consequence, make Israeli military operations against Iran in Syria, much more challenging. The system was indeed delivered. However, Russian interests in maintaining positive relations with Israel did not change, and in addition, Israel still holds the capacity to disrupt Russian plans in Syria. Therefore, after a few months passed, Prime Minister Netanyahu was welcomed again by President Putin in Moscow. The conclusions of the meeting are not yet known, but it is assumed the two countries agreed to continue their cooperation and reached operational understandings regarding the Syrian arena.

Another party operating in the Syrian arena is Turkey. Its aspirations and actions in the region as a whole are significant for Israel. Turkish president Erdogan is highly and
constantly antagonistic where Israel is concerned. Erdogan's policy is to maintain commercial interaction with Israel and low-level diplomatic relations (the ambassadors have been re-called). Meanwhile, Erdogan publicly expresses anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli positions, including an exchange of personal insults with the Israeli premier. Of greater concern is that Turkish policy under Erdogan is openly supportive of Hamas and subversive in Jerusalem. Turkey is financing welfare activities and Islamic institutions in Jerusalem. Furthermore, Turkey supports terrorists in social media websites while calling openly for violent protest against Israel. These actions and policies are part of Turkey's greater goal to become the dominant leader of the Muslim world and in particular, the Middle East hegemon.

It is directly related to Israel's shaky relations with Turkey that Israel is advancing strategic and energy cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. In addition to summits between the leaders of the three countries and their military, coordination and cooperation is on the rise. The formation of the EMGF (East Mediterranean Gas Forum) in 2019, that combines the three countries and Egypt, Jordan, Italy and the Palestinian Authority, also promotes regional cooperation and strengthens Israel's Mediterranean presence and ties.

SUMMARY AND INSIGHTS

Iran is the main threat Israel faces. The repeated declarations by senior Iranian officials alongside its ongoing and developing missile program and military nuclear potential present a genuine menace to Israel. As long as Iran does not reach a military nuclear capability, the threat to Israel will not be existential. Nevertheless, Iranian support of radical Islamic movements, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others, present a continuous danger to Israel. The threat is amplified by Iran's ongoing attempts to develop its conventional military capacity and its goal of regional hegemony. This is seen in Iranian subversive activities in the Middle East, Africa and beyond.

The silver lining is that Iran is perceived as a major threat not only by Israel but also by others, such as the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates. With the rationale of the enemy of my enemy is my friend, these countries have more in common with Israel than ever
before. Nevertheless, the relations of these countries with Israel remain clandestine, and only Jordan and Egypt maintain open, full diplomatic relations with Israel in the region. At present, these relations are limited in scope in terms of tourism, economy and other aspects of bilateral cooperation, in parallel to security and anti-terror cooperation between the leaderships.

The Israeli aspiration to have no Iranian military presence in Syria is hardly a realistic one. Iran is not expected to give up its goal of creating territorial continuity all the way to the Mediterranean. The declining willingness of the US to maintain significant ground and other forces in Syria makes this more likely. However, Israel can and must act for the purpose of minimizing Iran's hold in the areas close to its border in the south of Syria. It must also oppose any attempt by Iran to increase Hezbollah's infrastructure and arsenal in Lebanon and its destabilizing activities in the north of Israel. Strategically, beyond maintaining its technological military abilities, this requires first and foremost a constructive dialogue with Russia. The close and paralleled alliance with the US does not contradict a dialogue between Jerusalem and Moscow, which will enable Israel to continue operating against Iranian entrenchment in Syria (using the de-confliction mechanism), and other means.

Cooperation with the US and to a much lesser extent, Russia and the EU, are also necessary in order to manage the conflict with the Palestinians. Israel must preserve its freedom of action and a certain degree of international backing in order to contain Hamas's rule in Gaza. Israel should continue to limit Hamas's ability to govern and attempt to weaken its ability to launch rockets towards Israel. In the meantime, Israel should also make sure it prevents further deterioration of the economic situation and living conditions in Gaza, even under Hamas rule. This logic must be pursued until Hamas renounces its destructive intentions towards Israel and recognizes its existence. In parallel, Israel must manage its relations with the Palestinian Authority so the Authority continues its constructive security cooperation with Israel. This depends, to an extent, on the relatively positive economic situation in the Palestinian Authority and the ability to bring growth in the coming years. The Palestinian Authority's dependence on Israel for preventing the rise of Hamas in the West Bank contributes to the chances of further cooperation with Israel in the future.
In summary, Israel's handling of the Palestinian challenge is utterly different in the two different Palestinian entities, Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in the West bank. The relations with both, however, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a whole, are increasingly perceived by the international community as limited in its regional impact following the events of the "Arab Spring". These events, which followed the insurgencies of the "Arab Spring" including the conduct and practices of the Islamic State and other terror organizations, also created common international understanding of Israel's ongoing need to deal with terror organizations since it was established in 1948. The willingness of many countries to share knowledge and cooperate with Israel in fighting terror assist in creating common strategic ground for cooperation between Israel and the international community in other spheres.
CHAPTER 2

IDF DOCTRINE IN THE 21$^{\text{ST}}$ CENTURY: CHANGE AND ADAPTATION IN FACE OF NEW STRATEGIC REALITIES

EITAN SHAMIR

Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to describe the changes in IDF (Israel's Defense Forces) doctrine in recent decades while exploring the most prominent factors in driving these changes.

Since the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21$^{\text{st}}$ century, Israel has been experiencing important shifts in its strategic environment, while old threats have been reduced new threats have emerged. Other trends in technology and social composition also had an impact on Israel’s military doctrine. As a result, Israel's security and military doctrine went through some significant changes in its doctrine in order to adapt to these new realities.

This paper is structured in the following way: it commences by describing the tenets of Israel's traditional security and military doctrine, a doctrine that served the country well in its first decades of existence. It then proceeds to discuss those main factors that have been driving the change: Strategic environment, technology development and social change. Thereafter we will present the official view of the IDF based on its strategic doctrine document - the first one ever to be openly published.$^{1}$ Next the IDF response to

\[\text{\footnotesize 1} \quad \text{IDF Chief of the General Staff, IDF Strategy (Hebrew), August 2015, } \text{http://www.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/9/16919.pdf}; \quad \text{Michael Herzog, “The IDF Strategy Goes}\]
these challenges will be presented and finally we will mention some open-ended doctrinal issues that are still under debate.

**ISRAEL’S TRADITIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE**

The state of Israel was established in May 1948. From the moment of its establishment it had to fight in order to secure its survival. It won the War of Independence (November 1947 – July 1949) after overcoming the local struggle against Palestinian militias and thereafter repelling an invasion by a number of Arab state armies. However immediately after the war ended, it continued to endure low-intensity warfare - constant cross-border attacks, mostly by armed Palestinian gangs but also by the neighboring Arab states. It was also clear, due to Arab hostility, that another high-intensity round would occur sometime soon.²

Against this background, in 1953 Israel’s Prime Minister and founding father, David Ben Gurion produced his "18 Points Document", which served as the foundation for Israel's Security doctrine for decades ahead. First Ben Gurion laid out a list of assumptions:

- Arab hostility toward the State of Israel will likely continue for decades.
- Israel suffers from chronic inferiority in both territory and demographics.
- The major threat: a potential invasion of Israel by strong conventional forces ending the life of the young Jewish state.
- Israel's borders are long and lack natural barriers. However, Israel enjoys the advantage of ‘interior lines’ (except facing Jordan's West Bank).
- Also, the continuous terror attacks against border-settlements might slowly erode the population's confidence in the young state and endanger its existence in the long run.

• Given the physical asymmetry between Israel and the hostile Arab nations, Israel cannot achieve a decisive military victory to compel the Arabs to give up\(^3\). Israelis can only hope that by repeatedly achieving partial victories, they will cause Arab resolve against Israel to dissipate gradually. Those partial victories would, meanwhile, bring temporary respite between rounds of violence.

Ben Gurion concluded that only a series of decisive defeats on the battlefield might convince Arab regimes to accommodate the notion of Israel’s permanence.

Following his analysis, Israel’s strategic tenets as prescribed by Ben Gurion were the following\(^4\):

• Defend ourselves by ourselves and exhibit conventional superiority and self-reliance on the battlefield.

• Develop and maintain a "special relationship" with a superpower for the sake of diplomatic and material support - Israel sought an alliance with France and later on with the United States.

• Obtain technological superiority based on superior education and academic achievements to nurture a thriving industry and economy, the only way to compensate for resource inferiority.

• Possess moral and ideological certainty that Israel’s struggle is inherently just, which is critical for mobilizing a society that has to endure a long struggle.

• Nuclear capability – Israel will not get a second chance to correct its initial failures and therefore seeks the ultimate insurance\(^5\).

Ben Gurion and his military advisors divided the Arab threat into two categories\(^6\):

• the ‘Fundamental Threat’, in which the Arabs would launch a major offensive (high-intensity war) intent on physically annihilating Israel; and

---

\(^3\) David Ben-Gurion, *Uniqueness and Purpose*, Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1971, p. 219 (Hebrew).


\(^5\) Although this last point came years later in the 1960s, there is evidence that Ben Gurion was seeking such a capability very early on, see: Binyamin Pinkus, "Atomic Power to Israel's Rescue: French-Israeli Nuclear Cooperation, 1949–1957", *Israel Studies*, Vol. 7, Spring 2002, p. 110.

• the ‘Routine Threat’, in which the Arabs conduct constant small-scale raids (low-intensity conflict) in order to wear down the resolve of the Jewish population to remain in Israel.

The major and most immediate threat was the ‘Fundamental Threat’. To counter this threat the IDF was primarily designed. Due to its small population size, Israel cannot maintain a standing army large enough to face all levels of threats. Therefore, the major portion of Israel's military has to be a part-time force intended to be mobilized only when fighting intensifies to a level beyond the capability of the standing force. This, in turn, means that the army has to receive advance warning of the need to mobilize extra forces. Furthermore, in order to not cripple the national economy, operations involving such a mobilization must be brief enough to return mobilized soldiers to their civilian lives as soon as possible. The resulting security concept, was summed up in three catch-terms: 

_Deterrence – Early-Warning – Battlefield Decision_.

_Deterrence_, in the hope of avoiding warfare altogether. _Early warning_: if the deterrence fails the advanced intelligence branch should be able to provide sufficient early warning for the masses of reserves to mobilize. _Decision_ will be achieved by superior command and training and through the use of armor, air force and elite infantry that employ maneuver approach against enemy centers of gravity resulting in a quick destruction of enemy formation by “Blitzkrieg” type of operations.

Israel's security doctrine served the country well during the first four decades of its existence in October 1956 Suez Campaign and June 1967 Six Days war Israel initiated preemptive strikes when it felt threatened. In the October 1973 war, the early warning system failed, but other components of its security doctrine worked well and, after initial defeats, enabled Israel to turn the tables in this war.

In general, it could be argued that Israel's security doctrine, has been proven successful. Egypt, Israel's most dangerous rival, signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, followed by Jordan in 1994. Since the US war with Iraq in 1991 and invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Syrian Civil war in 2011, neither of these states’ armies are in a condition to pose a serious

_Yitzchak Ben-Israel, Israel Defense Doctrine_, Tel Aviv: Modan & Misrad Habitachon, 2013, pp. 59-67 (Hebrew).
threat on Israel’s border. Therefore, the historic ‘Fundamental Threat’ has been reduced to a minimum. However, at the same time serious new rivals have emerged forcing the IDF to adapt.

**FACTORS AFFECTING IDF SECURITY DOCTRINE**

The IDF recent doctrinal adaptation has been affected by three main factors. First and foremost are the types of threats and enemies - this will be discussed in the next section. In recent decades Israel has transformed itself into a technology power house. The Israeli military industries together with the IDF played a key role in this process. Lastly, gradual social changes, or at least the perception of them, have also influenced trends in IDF doctrinal development.

During the first few decades of independence, Israelis believed that the very existence of their embryonic state remained precarious. From the 1990s the ‘no alternative’ ethos was weakened. As a result of the effects of globalization and privatization transformed the once collective-socialist society into an individualistic society. Today, careers in security have been substituted by careers in high-tech, as demonstrated by the growing impact of young IDF officers on the thriving Israeli high-tech and IT sectors.

The nature of the low intensity conflicts in which Israel has been involved during the past decades has altered public expectations of the IDF. Until the 1973 War the IDF fought against stronger opponents and mistakes and casualties were expected. But since that war, operations incurring even minor casualties have often resulted in public criticism. Thus, politicians and senior IDF commanders have become more casualty averse preferring instead to employ technological solutions in an attempt to minimize casualties.

In the aftermath of the First Gulf War, the Israeli security establishment recognized the need to embrace information age technologies. Obviously, it fitted well with the

---

changes of Israeli society and the change in ethos discussed earlier. By the Second Gulf War (2003) it was decided that developmental and acquisition efforts should be directed toward RMA (Revolution in Military affairs) technologies. The focus was gradually directed toward technologies that were part of the information revolution\(^{11}\).

Thus, today, the solutions for operational challenges - such as rockets, tunnels, ATGM’s (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles), IED’s (Improvised Explosive Device) - are mainly sought in the form of technological solution. Accurate intelligence needed for the employment of advanced precision guided weapons delivered from afar has become the preferred modus operandi of the IDF, one that has substituted - as demonstrated in the IDF latest big operations in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2008, 2012, 2014) – the use of combined arms ground maneuver by large ground units such as division and brigades – the preferred IDF modus operandi and its main hallmark in past conflicts.

**THE CURRENT STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND MAIN THREATS**

The IDF strategic documents (2015 and an update 2018) identify Iran as the main threat to Israel at this time. Despite not sharing a border with Israel, Iran poses the gravest threat to Israel. Its revolutionary zeal and aspiration of dominance combined with a rich civilization, glorious past and vast resources, qualifies the country as a regional power. Using its Revolutionary Guard and various proxies Iran is pushing for dominance throughout the region: in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria, and is trying to create what seems to be an Iranian sphere all the way from Teheran to the shores of the Mediterranean.

Iran’s nuclear program poses a challenge on a different level. Iranian leaders threaten to "wipe up Israel from the map",\(^{12}\) specifying a date\(^{13}\) and stating that "Israel is a one [nuclear] bomb country".\(^{14}\) Such threats are taken very seriously by Israel. While the IDF

---

had made preparations and threaten to strike Iranian nuclear installations, curbing Iranian nuclear program is mostly conducted by the diplomacy and intelligence agencies.

Now that the Assad regime with Iranian backing is securing its victory, the threat of an Iranian military presence on Israel’s Syrian border is imminent. Additionally, the Syrian Army can rebuild itself and pose a threat as well.

Under the umbrella of the Iranian threat there are a number of violent non-state organizations – mainly Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Until a decade ago, Hamas and Hezbollah were incapable of escalating beyond low-intensity operations but now, supported and supplied by Iran, they have reached a capability to launch a potentially serious attack against Israel’s home front. According to intelligence estimates, Hezbollah has about 130,000 missiles and rockets deployed in Lebanon. Over the past few years, Hezbollah, acquired a great deal of experience employing thousands of fighters to capture or hold territory in the Syrian war and since 2011 has been threatening and training to invade Israel on the ground. Hezbollah is probably the most advanced military non-state organization force worldwide, relying heavily on Iranian supply, mentoring and training. Hezbollah ground forces are deployed in southern Lebanon, to defend the large offensive artillery capability that can strike targets all across Israel. As in 2006, the rocket-artillery arm is the main offensive weapon, but Hezbollah intends to also capture Israeli territory adjacent to the border and raid objectives deep inside Israel by using elite units trained in Iran, as was demonstrated by the discovery of its elaborate system of offensive tunnels exposed on the Lebanon – Israeli border.

Another source of military threat are groups such as, the Islamic State, who are capable of conducting only limited terrorist or guerrilla attacks on Israel, across the border from Egypt.

---

17 Thus, for example, in summer 2012, it was reported that Hezbollah had conducted an Iranian-mentored exercise in which 10,000 fighters practiced defensive battles and attacks to capture portions of northern Israel. N. Yahav, "Hezbollah Conducted 10,000 Man Exercise" (Hebrew), Walla News. http://news.walla.co.il/item/2560837.
The IDF identifies three hostile axis/alliances in the region that are antagonistic to state of Israel:

*The Shia’ alliance*, led by Iran. This alliance generates terror, its main conventional threat is the use of the various types of missiles and it has a motivation to develop nuclear capability.

The second hostile axis are various Palestinians groups attempting to undermine Israel through the use of various means including terror, law-fare and propaganda to undermine Israel’s international legitimacy so as to gradually cripple the country until it reaches the point of its collapse.

Lastly are Sunni Jihadi groups, ISIS or Al-Qaeda is mainly a low-intensity terror threat.

Against these axes and their hostile actions and intentions Israel must employ a combination of military and diplomatic power. First and foremost, Israel can rely on its ‘special relations’ with the US and should increase its diplomatic and military collaboration.

Secondly, it should continue to foster its military coordination with Russia in regard to the presence of Russian forces in Syria.

Thirdly, Israel and the IDF should continue to build strong alliances with regional friendly countries such as Greece and Cyprus by increasing joint maneuvers and military coordination.

**The IDF Doctrinal and Force Structure Response**

The IDF has stated two general basic principles and objectives for the use of force:

- Decisive Approach – Aiming to change the Status Quo.
Decisive approach calls for large scale high intensity operation by employing and concentrating maximum IDF capabilities in minimum time frame for the sake of far reaching result such as changing the military or/and the political realities in the region.

- Denial and Preemption Approach- Aiming to maintain the Status Quo.

While the IDF should be ready for decisive operations it will be most likely engage most of the time in limited operations (in goals and scope), such as the recent operations in Gaza (2008, 2012, and 2014).

Another relative new dimension to Israel's military doctrine is what the IDF calls "MABAM", the Hebrew acronym for the "operations between the wars". A constant string of covert operations designed to destroy key assets of Israel’s opponents such as Hamas in Gaza but increasingly Hezbollah and Iranian high-value assets in Syria\textsuperscript{19}. The cumulative effect of these operations is to weaken the enemy's capabilities and postpone the next war\textsuperscript{20}. In addition, the doctrine calls for the use of “influence operations” mainly through the use of cyber and defensive measures.

The IDF has embraced a few operational principles to guide its force development:

- **Multi Domain Maneuver** aiming to capture and destroy high value targets. The IDF operates within five domains (land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace), and multi-domain maneuver employs military capabilities in these domains simultaneously and cohesively in supporting capabilities to create conditions designed to generate and enable forces freedom of movement and action.

- **Precision Standoff Fire based on Quality Intelligence** – The employment of precision fire allows Israel to use its technological advantage and to minimize its own casualties as well as collateral damage. Effective use of precision fire is conditioned on real-time high-quality intelligence to generate targets. This becomes a very difficult task against an enemy such as Hamas and Hezbollah, who as guerrilla type organizations maintain very low signature.


• **Special Operations and PSYOP** - One way to counter terror and guerrilla is by employing special operations forces that conduct pinpoint operations against these organizations. The goals of these operations are not to destroy these organizations but rather to disrupt and influence their moral.

• **Defense active and passive** – The main strategic threat is not an invasion of land armies but the thousands of various types of missiles and rockets aimed at Israel’s rear. While a strong offensive capability is critical to deter and suppress enemy fire it is not sufficient and must be complemented with defensive capabilities, both an active defense system that will keep Israel’s strategic installations in working order and passive measures to protect the civilian population.

These operational principles are currently translated in the IDF on-going five years plan force build up in the following key ways:

- **Reinforcing the ground maneuver** capability to overcome the ATGM’s and explosive traps of Hezbollah and Hamas by creating at least three heavy elite armored divisions, well trained and equipped with the Merkava 4 tanks and heavy Namer’s APC armed and equipped with advanced active protection systems such the Trophy and Iron Fist.

- **Special operations forces and capabilities** – In order to enhance its special operations capabilities the IDF has taken a few steps in recent years: It has created a new Commando Brigade, Oz 89. The brigade was created through the converging of some of its special units: Egoz, Rimon, Duvdevan, and Maglan into a single Commando Brigade thus enabling for unified training, doctrine and equipment for these assortments of small units and to allow better utilization of these units in during operations. The commando brigade is part of the 98th Airborne Division, the IDF elite Division which includes another 3 paratroop brigades (two in reserves) and other smaller special mission units. The division's main purpose is vertical flanking deep inside enemy territory. The Commando and the 98th Davison will be commanded and controlled by the Depth Headquarters – a dedicated command organization that was created as a result of lessons learned from recent large operations which showed that Israel's Special Forces were underutilized.
- **Stand off fire** - In recent decades the IDF has been constantly acquiring and improving its fire capabilities. In fact, the IDF has been leading the RMA. Two important developments in recent years are the establishment of a missile corps in the ground forces with missiles capable of reaching 300 KM. Another tendency is to reinforce divisions and brigades with enhanced independent fire assets by providing them more for example MLRS batteries and other advanced artillery and fire capabilities.

- **Air Power** – Mastery of the skies has always been critical in Israel’s security doctrine. The decision to acquire a few F-35 squadrons is congruent with the Israel’s Air Force tradition to equip itself with the best fighter jet it can achieve, as the all-purpose fighter jets are the backbone of the Air force. The F-35 carries some unique capabilities and will allow the IAF to enhance its reach and maintain its lead in the region. Israel’s is also a world leader in the development and use of drones. Drones are used for a variety of missions and their number and sophistication are rapidly developing. The emphasis on drones from various types will continue to grow.

- **Israel’s maritime power** - Traditionally, Israel’s navy was quite small and though technological advanced, it was mainly designed as a local force to protect Israel’s shores and seaports. Two developments in recent decades caused a significant buildup in the Navy’s capability: This first is the growing threat of Iran and the second is the natural gas discoveries.

  The purchase of six Dolphin class submarines from Germany, each capable of carrying a combined total of up to 16 torpedoes and submarine-launched cruise missiles. According to the press these cruise missiles have a range of at least 1,500 km (930 mi) and are widely believed to be able of carrying nuclear warhead. If true, it would provide Israel with an offshore nuclear second-strike capability against a possible nuclear Iran in the future. These submarines are also a force multiplier in the conventional sense and play a major part in Israel’s capability to project power beyond its borders. The second development are the off shore gas discoveries in the Mediterranean. The same German

---


Shipyard, Thyssen-Krupp, that has built the submarines is building four Sa’ar (corvette type missile boats) patrol vessels for protecting the Israeli offshore gas fields. These boats will join the existing Sa’ar fleet in Israel’s Navy.

- **Missile Defense** – In contrast to the past, there is a new emphasis on defensive measures in the form of substantial investment in systems that can intercept incoming missiles and rockets, most notably the triage that supplement each other: the Iron Dome, David's Sling and Arrow systems. The IDF has also formed its Homefront Command with authority to guide civilians in time of crises and invested in training first responders that have the expertise to intervene in disaster areas. The magnitude of the missile threat had also led to increasing US-Israeli military cooperation (and a deviation from the complete self-reliance principle). Since 2001, once every two years, the IDF and the United States European Command (US EUCOM) train together to improve cooperation and coordination between the armies. An essential part of the exercise is integrating US Navy warships equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (Aegis BMD) designed against short to intermediate-range ballistic missiles, with Israel’s missile defense systems further enhancing Israel’s missile defense capability.

- **Intelligence** - Israel puts even greater emphasis on intelligence, this is evident in the high priority the intelligence corps receives in high quality recruits over other branches. The intelligence corps has increased in size and specialization to include, tactical and field intelligence, real time intelligence for target acquisition, strategic intelligence, human and cultural intelligence (reading the Arab street following the “Arab Spring”), cyber capabilities (offense and defense).

- **Border protection and territories policing** – Israel’s long borders along loosely governed territories such as the Sinai Peninsula and its control of Palestinian territory led the IDF to form units specializing in patrolling and policing these areas. These forces are lightly equipped and are trained for these missions. They can therefore free up other forces to train and specialize for high intensity scenarios. Some of these forces are Reserves while others consist of mixed female and male battalions.
SUMMARY

The last decades saw major shifts in the region surrounding Israel. Following the US invasion to Iraq 2003 and the so called “Arab Spring” some threats to Israel’s security declined while others have increased. Consequently, Israel has had to adapt its security doctrine. Israel’s main antagonist are still the Palestinians, who do not pose an existential threat, but its current strongest antagonist in the region is a Muslim non-Arab country that does not share a border with it: Iran. As a consequence, the conflict takes shapes in many forms and shapes: various types of warfare, different locations and domains, both direct and through proxies. But while Iran is the major threat Israel confronts, it is by no means the only one.

While many of Israel’s traditional security tenets from David Ben Gurion’s era have not changed, the large spectrum of threats Israel is facing necessitated different emphasis on some elements of its force structure while further building and improving others.

The IDF is currently debating future directions of its force development. Questions are asked and debated, for example, in regard to the role of heavy armored ground forces versus the use of special operations and/or air power and precision fire. Other questions are asked in regard to the role of drones versus manned aircraft or the utility of cyber operations during war.

While these debates are going on, as is often the case in Israel’s history, they are most likely to be decided in tests of fire, and the hard lessons they will derive will continue to guide the IDF's doctrine and force development.

CHAPTER 3

CASUALTIES AND ISRAELI SOCIETY

Yagil Levy
Open University of Israel

Israel was created at the beginning of the twentieth century as a colonial project of Jewish emigrants, mainly from Eastern Europe. During the formative years of the pre-state political community, a conflict developed between the Jewish and Palestinian communities, which were both under British rule. Gradually, the conflict escalated from local clashes to intercommunal conflict, culminating in the 1948 War between Israel and the surrounding Arab states following the formal establishment of the Israeli state. Since then, Israel has been embroiled in a prolonged conflict with the Arab world. Since 1860, about 24,000 people have died in wars,¹ the costliest of which was that of 1948, during which about 6,000 people fell, approximately one percent of the whole population. Notwithstanding these heavy burdens, Israel tolerated casualties and when this tolerance declined, it adapted to the new reality by changing policies.

This article describes the dynamics in legitimizing military death. It begins with the emergence of the casualty sensitivity syndrome in Israeli society and the mapping of its determinants. The article proceeds with a presentation of the different forms of casualty sensitivity and its policy impacts.

EMERGENCE OF THE CASUALTY SENSITIVITY SYNDROME

Until the 1970s, Israel tolerated casualties. Public discourse was dominated by the

hegemonic bereavement model, according to which death in war was presented as the norm and casualties were viewed as heroes, in accordance with the perception that Israel faced existential threats. Bereaved parents refrained from publicly voicing any concerns or demands regarding their loss, and even expressed pride. In return, they became symbolic public figures lauded by the public and the establishment.

The 1970s and 1980s marked the turning point; it was during these years that the legitimacy accorded to military sacrifice began to erode and the casualty sensitivity syndrome developed.

In the 1973 War, Israel was surprised by an Egyptian-Syrian attack that was barely pushed back and Israel suffered some 2,500 fatalities, about 0.1 percent of the total Jewish population. This war shattered the public perception of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) as having unlimited power, a perception that had crystallized following the 1967 War in which Israel impressively defeated the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria and expanded its borders. The impacts of the 1973 War resulted in deeper changes that matured politically during the First Lebanon War (1982-1985). This war was sold to the public as a “short-term” military operation to uproot the Palestinian mini-state led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon, which threatened the civilian population in the north of Israel. However, once it became apparent that Israel had resorted to force in order to reshape internal Lebanese politics—an objective that prolonged the fighting and necessitated an extended siege of Beirut in July and August 1982—antiwar demonstrations erupted. For the very first time, the criteria for legitimizing the use of force were subject to debate; protest groups focused on the goals of the war, which was categorized as one of “choice,” and therefore distinct from the “wars of no choice” Israel had waged previously. Ultimately, the IDF was dragged into a war of attrition against Shiite militias in south Lebanon for three additional years, culminating in about 650 IDF casualties. In 1985, largely due to further antiwar protests, the IDF unilaterally withdrew from parts of Lebanon.

---

5 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, pp. 206-229.
Heavy burdens decreased the legitimacy of sacrificing mainly in conjunction with other factors, similar to those seen in other Western democracies: (1) The ascendancy of a market society that was affected by Israel’s exposure to globalization. The market ethos together with globalization enhanced the liberal discourse, challenged previous collectivist commitments and symbols, and increased criticism of the military expenditure that had risen since the 1973 War and was not offset by any war-produced economic gains. (2) The decline in the perception of the external threat since, following the 1967 War, Israel had established its regional dominance. Furthermore, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, signed in 1979, proved that even very significant existential threats could be removed by diplomatic means—in this case, at the cost of complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula which had been captured in 1967. This could challenge the rightness of future wars which, in turn, would negatively affect the legitimacy of sacrificing. (3) The destabilization of the republican exchange between state civilian institutions and the citizenry which had laid the infrastructure for the state’s capacity to mobilize the Jewish community for war sacrifice. However, this exchange was destabilized after the 1970s when military service lost much of its value in a market society, the liberal discourse undermined soldiering as a criterion for social benefits, and groups which did not serve in the army collected significant rewards which were not contingent upon the test of military service. In addition, military failures ruptured the image of the Ashkenazi (Jews of European descent), middle-class warriors, the social backbone of the IDF.

However, as the literature has already shown, circumstantial political factors can reinforce (or mitigate) such social trends and heighten casualty sensitivity, as follows:

1. An increase in the log of cumulative casualties. In the case of Israel, 2,500 fatalities in the three weeks of the 1973 War and 230 in the first week of the First Lebanon War (June 1982) reinforced the existing erosion of the social willingness to sacrifice.
2. Paradoxically, when casualty rates are low, the media presents the fallen to decision-makers and the public as individuals, with names and faces. Individualization

---

6 Levy, Israel’s Death Hierarchy, pp. 42-46.
increases sensitivity to loss. Indeed, casualty sensitivity rose as the numbers of fallen decreased. For example, after 1983 during the First Lebanon War, Israeli television broadcast soldiers’ funerals, and this negatively affected public tolerance of casualties.

3. As Gelpi et al. maintained, public anticipation that the military operation will not accomplish its goals reduces tolerance for casualties. A sense of failure in the 1973 War, and especially in the First Lebanon War where Israel was embroiled in costly guerilla warfare, presented the sacrifices as worthless.

4. Rightness of the war increases tolerance and vice versa, as happened during the First Lebanon War the rightness of which as a “war of choice” was challenged and tolerance decreased.

5. Elite dissensus negatively affects tolerance for casualties, as was the case with the First Lebanon War, the first war initiated by a rightist government and therefore challenged by the left-center wing.

6. The social profile of casualties matters. The greater the presence of middle-class groups among the casualties, the greater the likelihood of protest emerging from the ranks. In the First Lebanon War, which claimed the lives of about 230 soldiers, some 70 percent of the casualties in the first week came from the secular middle class, with 20 percent of all casualties coming from the upper-middle class. A third of all casualties were reservists. It was the most organized, wealthy and sacrifice-averse social stratum in Israeli society that created the infrastructure for the protest.

7. In sum, these political factors reinforced the impacts of the social trends generating casualty sensitivity. Politically, this sensitivity took two forms: antiwar collective action and a subversive bereavement discourse.

---

11 Ibid.
FORMS OF CASUALTY SENSITIVITY

Bereavement-informed collective action is the form of casualty sensitivity which most effectively translates changes in public opinion into effective pressure on the government to redeploy the forces and even halt missions. In Israel, the initiation of such collective action followed the operation to conquer Beaufort Castle in south Lebanon on the first night of the First Lebanon War. It claimed the lives of six soldiers and, in response, a few bereaved families formed a group known as the Beaufort Family. Instead of interpreting the mission as heroic, as bereaved parents had in previous wars, these parents viewed it as a futile operation and blamed the government for the loss of their sons, thus sparking the antiwar protest.\(^{15}\)

As the IDF became embroiled in a guerilla war in Lebanon, more groups were formed, the most important of which was Soldiers against Silence composed of reserve soldiers in 1983. Together with the peace movement Peace Now, this group initiated a permanent demonstration outside Prime Minister Begin’s home, beginning in April 1983, displaying long lists of the names of the casualties and an updated daily casualty count.\(^{16}\) Ultimately, in large measure because of the protests, which prompted the formation of a relatively moderate, broad-based coalition government following the general elections of 1984, the IDF unilaterally withdrew from parts of Lebanon in 1985.\(^{17}\)

Politically, the second withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 was more significant. Although Israel had ended the First Lebanon War in 1985 by unilaterally withdrawing its troops, it was dragged into a guerrilla war against Hezbollah forces in the security zone that Israel still occupied as a buffer between Lebanon and northern Israeli towns. During the years 1985-2000, this war claimed more than 300 IDF fatalities.\(^{18}\)

The turning point came in February 1997. Two military helicopters collided en route to Lebanon and claimed the lives of 73 soldiers. In response, the middle-class-based Four Mothers movement was founded by mothers of soldiers who were serving in Lebanon at

---

15 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
16 Ibid., p. 54.
17 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, pp. 206-229.
the time of the helicopter accident. *Four Mothers* led the campaign to pull Israel out of Lebanon unilaterally and unconditionally. In its discourse, the movement challenged the costs and compared them to the political and military logic of the specific mission in terms not of rightness, but rather of logic\(^{19}\). Ultimately, the campaign played a key role in shifting public opinion and driving the Israeli government to unilaterally withdraw its troops from Lebanon in 2000; or at least this achievement was later attributed to the movement’s actions\(^{20}\). This cost-centered discourse created a new cultural barrier to war sacrifices, known as “Lebanon phobia,” which would play a key role in the Second Lebanon War of 2006\(^ {21}\).

Common to these collective actions was the development of a subversive bereavement discourse. Bereavement discourse refers to the way that various social groups interpret the loss of their children’s lives, or the potential risk to their lives posed by their military service, and how they translate this into public discourse, on a spectrum of attitudes from subversive to submissive. A subversive bereavement discourse seeks to undermine the assumptions that support the mobilization for war. It can either challenge the war’s justification and rightness or question its costs\(^ {22}\).

For example, “Do not use spears and the bodies of our sons to try to dictate who shall rule in Lebanon,” wrote Yehoshua Zamir\(^ {23}\), a bereaved father, member of the *Beaufort Family*, to Israel’s Prime Minister a few days after his son was killed in the Beaufort operation. A similar tone was voiced by one of the activists of *Soldiers against Silence*: “I am not willing to die for a strong government in Lebanon…for Israeli solidarity…for military discipline…for an insane government”\(^ {24}\). *Four Mothers* used a more moderate rhetoric, focused on the logic and the costs rather than challenging the rightness of the war, as Rachel Ben Dor, the movement’s founder, presented the motivation to act:

> On the night of the helicopter disaster I became forcefully aware of the

---

\(^{19}\) *Levy, Israel’s Death Hierarchy*, pp. 72-76.


\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 76.


terrible price we were paying in the Lebanese quagmire. I made up my mind that something must be done to stop the endless bloodletting. My assumption was that if these were the results, there must be something wrong with the means that we must call for a change, for improvement in the situation; and not accepting it as if it was preordained.25

In sum, the combination of collective action and a subversive bereavement discourse translated the sensitivity into a political factor. What are the impacts?

IMPACTS OF CASUALTY SENSITIVITY

As the literature shows, casualty sensitivity has multiple impacts on policy-making, as follows:

1. **Casualty aversion:** A military policy that strives to limit risk or even avoid missions that could result in casualties. While the protests described above generated re-deployments in Lebanon, “Lebanon phobia” which had already taken hold was best demonstrated in the Second Lebanon War. In July 2006, Israel launched a full-scale war against Lebanon in response to the abduction of two soldiers by Hezbollah militiamen on the Israeli-Lebanese border. Military policies were informed by sensitivity to the soldiers’ lives. Therefore, concern about casualties led the government to rule out a ground operation, and the Israel military deployed the air force. Aerial assaults, however, failed to stop Hezbollah from launching rockets and injuring civilians in Israel’s northern towns, resulting in the death of about 40 civilians. Nevertheless, favoring the soldiers’ lives over the lives of Israel’s own civilians contributed to the hesitation to approve a ground operation inside Lebanon, which would have been effective in clearing out the launchers26. Ultimately, Israel was reluctantly dragged into a short ground operation that resulted in more than 100 fatalities, but it failed to achieve the war’s goals and Israel accepted a ceasefire27.

2. **Risk transfer:** Adoption of a counter-fire doctrine, first implemented during the 1990s in Lebanon, premised on standoff precision armaments (artillery, fighter aircraft and gradually drones). Thus, the combatants’ exposure to risk was reduced but it was

Chapter 3 — Casualties and Israeli Society [Levy]

shifted to enemy noncombatants. This policy was best demonstrated in the ground operations Israel initiated against the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip in the years 2005-2014 to halt rocket fire from Gaza to Israel\textsuperscript{28}.

3. \textbf{The removal of politically active and casualty-sensitive reservists from friction zones:} Reserve soldiers are more likely to engage in political protest than regular conscripts and against this background their deployments have been limited since the 1990s\textsuperscript{29}.

4. \textbf{Revising Israel’s military doctrine:} In 2016, the IDF introduced a multi-year efficiency plan based upon careful strategic planning and premised on the assumption that the Israeli public no longer tolerates gradual escalations leading to prolonged campaigns. This may necessitate the application of overwhelming military power at the outset in order to end any military conflict decisively and swiftly\textsuperscript{30}.

5. \textbf{Realignment of the social composition of field units:} This was accomplished by encouraging the integration of soldiers from lower-class and religious groups who still regarded military service as a track for upward mobility and therefore, together with their social networks, they displayed more motivation to sacrifice. The service attracted Mizrachim (the 1950s’ immigrants from Muslim countries), the 1990s’ immigrants from the former Soviet Union and from Ethiopia, women (who until the 1990s were excluded from combat roles) and most importantly, religious enlistees, who associated military service with religious values. The steep drop in the proportion of secular middle-class casualties from about 68.5% during the first week of the Lebanon War to about 45.5% in the second Intifada, matched by casualties from the lower-class rising by similar proportions, clearly reflected the IDF’s new social makeup. The Second Lebanon War in 2006 further confirmed this trend, while also mirroring changes in attitudes toward bereavement, which now assumed a more submissive tone. Because the proportion of fatalities among upper middle-class regulars and reservists was relatively small, critics of that campaign failed to generate a critical mass for effective political protest\textsuperscript{31}. A similar pattern occurred during Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014, when 65 IDF soldiers were killed, mostly in flawed attempts to destroy tunnels leading from Gaza into Israel. Here again,


\textsuperscript{31} Levy, \textit{Israel’s Death Hierarchy}, pp. 84-89.
despite revelations of command incompetence, the tone of bereavement still continued to be private, contained, and deferential.

In sum, growing casualty shyness had several policy-oriented impacts through which the government could balance aversion to missions with steps mitigating the negative impacts (from its perspective) of such sensitivity.

**CONCLUSION**

Since the 1990s, Israel has reflected the Western pattern of decreasing tolerance for military casualties. Similar to other industrialized democracies, the ascendancy of market society together with decreasing existential threats attenuated this tolerance in conjunction with political variables such as the likelihood of achieving a mission’s goals or its rightness. Bereavement-informed antiwar collective action limited the government’s freedom of action to deploy troops in risky missions. However, Israeli society has adapted to the new reality by changing the military doctrine, realigning the social composition of the troops and increasing the reliance on technology. Consequently, the government and the military have re-expanded their freedom of operation, enabling them to sustain warfare in the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict.

---

CHAPTER 4

PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOURSSES AND THE MILITARY IN ISRAEL¹

Eyal Ben-Ari

Kinneret Center on Peace, Security and Society in Memory of Dan Shomron

In a study carried out a decade and a half ago, Edna Lomsky-Feder and I² examined the place of psychological discourses in constructing understandings of war and military service in Israel. This paper represents an update of that contribution. The central argument is that these discourses work to incorporate notions about war and service into the “normal” routines of social life. Concretely, we examined three discourses: the developmental focusing on how military service is constructed as a “natural” stage in progression towards adulthood and manhood; the therapeutic discourse centers on the traumatic influences of war on warriors and (since the first Intifada and the Gulf War) civilians and thereby blurs the power relations between Israelis and Palestinians; the organizational psychological one deals with the military’s effectiveness by likening it to other organizations and thus obscuring its unique character as specializing in the organized use of violence. Here I offer a shortened and updated version of that article.

The background to our analysis is the expansion of psychological discourses that explain and orient behavior in contemporary industrial societies. We follow previous scholars³

---

¹ This is a shortened and updated version of an article that appeared as Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari, “Psychological Discourses and the Normalization of War and the Military in Israel”, Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak, eds., Militarism and Israeli Society, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2010, pp. 280-304.


in defining the “psychological” as encompassing the public life of psychological disciplines, as changing visions of the psychological interior, and as a set of “common-sense” or “folk” models for interpreting social phenomena. During the past decades these discourses have moved from the academic and professional fields to become widely used "lay" theories that people around the industrialized world employ to interpret their lives. In other words, they have become mundane or common-sense knowledge.

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MILITARY: A “NATURAL” WAY OF GROWING UP

Nation-states are based on the idea of mass armies based on enthusiastic young men willing to sacrifice their lives for the state\(^4\). Such ideas endow the experience of war and military service with meaning in terms of maturation and achieving manhood. In Israel this connection seems to be especially strong\(^5\). The ideal of man-the-warrior is anchored in the central image of the Zionist revolution: the native-born Israeli as the “New Jew”\(^6\). The "New Jew" was an answer to the imagery of the weak, effeminate body of the Diaspora Jew that had haunted common perceptions of Jews and Jewish self-perceptions\(^7\).

During the last two decades, these ideals have been challenged\(^8\). Many groups within society pose questions about what were previously taken for granted matters as motivation to serve, evasion of military service, or the idea of “man-the-warrior”. Yet at the same time, acceptance of demands to be a man-soldier is still perceived to be a precondition for “full” Israeli membership\(^9\). Combat service is still seen as superior to other kinds of service, and to a great degree, military service is still accepted as part of

---

the normal and normative life-course. The former Chief Psychologist of the IDF expressed the ‘natural’ link between adulthood, manhood and the military during a conference on the influence of war on Israeli soldiers:

I see a parallel between sex, pregnancy and birth and wars. In Israel being in the military and going through war is natural like becoming pregnant and giving birth in the regular pattern of mature sex life\(^\text{10}\).

Building on his professional authority as a psychologist, this officer poses a resemblance between sex, pregnancy and birth as the most fundamental processes of life and the ‘naturalness’ of war in the lives of Israeli men. Indeed, in Israel the discourse on war and military service as a “natural” stage in the (especially male) life-course is central in routinizing them into individual lives. This process is based on a universalistic model of individual psychological development according to which life is a sequence of developmental stages characterized by particular psychological profiles and specific developmental tasks. Accordingly, in this “universal” psycho-developmental model, youthhood is differentiated from stages coming before and after it and said to be characterized by emotional turmoil, a “natural” attraction of men to danger and adventure, and a concurrent attraction to ideals and a search for identity\(^\text{11}\).

Moreover, according to the universalistic developmental model, adolescence is characterized by a search for meaning and total, uncompromising social participation. Hence participation in war, according to soldiers’ accounts, is often perceived as an expression of commitment to the values of society and loyalty to the state. These expressions often take on a romantic, naïve character that allows no space for critique. One example is an article about an officer who was killed in Lebanon during a skirmish with Hizbullah. In the account, one commander relates a conversation he had with him about death:

All during my military service I was in dangerous activities and I scraped with death. The role necessitates this. You have to take this into account. Uri looked at me and answered without hesitation, "I tell my family and my

\(^{10}\) Quoted in Helena De Sevilia, et.al., *What do the Wars Do to Us?*, Zikhron Yaakov: Israeli Center for Military Studies, 1992 (Hebrew), pp. 5-6.

girlfriend that I will never be hurt, but I know that I may die. I am ready for this, but if it happens, I want to be killed in battle.”

The harsh experiences of war in many men’s stories are, moreover, often interpreted by the developmental model as an ‘identity crisis’ within the process of maturation. The fact that a war is interpreted as an identity crisis in becoming an adult and not as a “disaster” or “psychological calamity” softens its impact. Because a crisis of identity is not a deviation or anomaly in adolescence, a crisis brought on by war is thus seen as “normal” and not related to the specific historical context of Israel. This kind of conception is a product of the wider context in which military service is seen as an arena for maturation, and more important, as an arena within which youngsters can face the central developmental tasks of creating individual autonomy, separation from parents and the crystallization of identity.

The perception of military service as such an arena is also created outside the family. Thus for example, these messages are explicitly transmitted in graduation ceremonies in Jewish high-schools when adults – teachers and parents – talk about the upcoming recruitment of the graduates. Furthermore, various programs for preparing youngsters for military service (within and outside the educational systems), expose youngsters to ideas centered on maturity, the importance of service and the army as a place for expressing and achieving personal aims. In other words, the developmental discourse of maturation has become a central interpretive frame for the naturalization of military service as part of a key scenario in contemporary Jewish-Israeli society.

The developmental model then, forms a key cultural mechanism through which the powerful experiences of war and military service are turned “normal” and even normative things. It normalizes war into the life-course through stabilizing the experience, toning down the crisis, and anchoring both in models that are a-contextual. Maturation becomes part of the social order and a defined stage in a developmental course that is known,

---

12 Shlomo Abramowitz, “A legend in His Time”, Yedioth Aharonot, November 1, 1996.
13 Edna Lomsky-Feder, As If There Was No War: The Perception of War in the Life Stories of Israeli Men, Jerusalem: Magnes, 1998 (Hebrew).
explained and regulated (among other things through scientific theories). In this way, the effects of war can be constructed between the “natural” and the expected (the process of maturation) and the arbitrary and the uncontrolled (the reality of war). It can be thus said that war disrupts maturation while maturation stabilizes war.

**PSYCHOTHERAPY: PATHOLOGIZING AND TRIVIALIZING THE EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE**

The second discourse – the therapeutic/traumatic one – has gained force since the 1970s (especially in the wake of the Vietnam War). At its beginnings, this discourse contained critical elements focusing on the morality of war and in Israel it often emphasized private suffering rather than collective mourning. Here, however, we wish to show another side of this discourse; its normalizing variant.

**SOCIAL BOUNDARIES, HIERARCHIES AND TRAUMA**

In every war, soldiers undergo hardships and may carry traumatic memories. It is social factors, however, that decide whether these voices will be heard: traumatic memories result not only from individual experiences but can only be articulated by people who have received social sanction to do so. Lomsky-Feder illuminates these dynamics through narratives of veterans of the 1973 war that reflect the absence of social approval to express private traumatic memory. The social imperative voiced was ‘business as usual,’ that is, going on with their lives as if the war had not occurred. According to her interviewees, coming to terms with the war implied proper behavior during battle and not being affected by battle at war’s end. This perception reflected a dominant cultural assumption linking one’s performance in war and its effect on one’s life: that is, by meeting the expectations of the Israeli fighter’s ethos, one is not affected by war and thus considered a real man.

This ethos underlies the complex perception of post-trauma in Israel. Until the 1970s such reactions were silenced by state authorities, but since then individuals suffering...

---

17 Lomsky-Feder, *As If There Was No War*.
20 Lomsky-Feder, *As If There Was No War*. 
PTSD have been much more present in the public eye and treated within and outside the army. Only in the past years have they been awarded benefits similar to those given the physically wounded (although significant gaps between the groups remain) \(^{21}\). Additionally, the right of veterans to criticize, for instance, defense policy is seen be legitimate because they fulfilled the ultimate call for personal sacrifice and because in voicing their pain and critique they do not undermine the fighter’s ethos – the hegemonic masculinity. In fact, only those men who epitomize the ethos, proven themselves during war, are entitled to be affected by it.

The intense cultural preoccupation with the experience of warriors (always a minority of soldiers) is part of how war is “naturalized” in Israel. Emotional stories about wars may ironically allow non-participants to take war out of their lives because they often lead to the ventilation of emotions, yet rarely to examine the implications of being perpetrators or victims of violence. This cathartic function is most evident around Remembrance Day or anniversaries of wars. There are many newspaper articles and television and radio programs stressing the pain and suffering brought about by war. The intense debates about the price of war taking place during such occasions allow individuals to feel purified and continue their lives “as usual”.

**EVERYONE TRAUMATIZED**

Within the IDF there is a vast research literature rooted in psychology and psychiatry examining battle reactions \(^{22}\). These investigations concentrate on the therapeutic practices by which soldiers suffering such reactions are returned to active duty and their orientation is recuperative and restorative (and pertinent to a minority of soldiers). What has happened in Israel during the past three decades is that this discourse has been generalized and “civilianized” to apply to all (mainly Jewish) Israelis. For example, the idea of conceiving of Israeli society as traumatized is a passage from a booklet dealing with children in emergency: “We live in difficult and confusing times, under the constant

---


threat of crisis and tragedy – and this theme takes on many forms… everyone is perforce a victim”.

And indeed, more and more groups define themselves or are defined by others as being traumatized. Plotkin-Amrami’s\textsuperscript{23} work is especially interesting in that she shows how the Jewish settler community has mobilized this discourse to bring relief to their distress and to seek empathy from the wider public by constructing the disengagement from Gaza as a national trauma. The point, as Nolan\textsuperscript{24} suggests, is that as “the therapeutic perspective has spilled into culture more broadly, so has the belief that a growing number of human actions represent diseases or illnesses that need to be healed”. From our perspective, as war is seen to breed ailments, it must be treated through psychological methods. The fact that so many groups are seen to be “traumatized” thus banalizes the experience. From being a phenomenon that is unique to certain individuals or groups, trauma has become a concept that characterizes a whole, a public.

**THE SOLDIER: FROM HEROIC IMAGERY TO THERAPEUTIC DISCOURSE**

The culture of bereavement in contemporary Israel has increasingly turned into a psychological-traumatic one. Rather than focusing on soldiers as heroes, memorial ceremonies now concentrate on the bereaved, grieving family. Pictures of victims, weeping soldiers, and stunned or screaming family members accompany such events, and are prominently displayed in the media. War and war-making continue to be at the center of public attention not through tales of heroism but through accounts of suffering\textsuperscript{25}. The stress on individual vulnerability is related to how soldiers have been infantalized in many discussions about the IDF. In the past few years, an array of protective representations of soldiers have emerged alongside the ethos of the young hero. Two recent autobiographies\textsuperscript{26} depict military service as characterized by suffering and depression (in a television program devoted to the books they are described as documenting “trauma”).


\textsuperscript{26} Boaz Neumann, A Good Soldier, Tel-Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 2001 (Hebrew); Orr Spivak, My Golani. Tel-Aviv: Prague, 2001 (Hebrew).
Furthermore, the weeping of soldiers has become a subject for public debate. Presenting opinions from military men, academics, and psychologists one finds competing interpretations of soldiering and manhood in this debate. As one correspondent in rather cynical terms describes it “The stress on ‘hitting at them’ and ‘we’ll break their bones’ is now replaced by weeping… Spartan emotionality is transformed into exaggerated expressions”27. One illustration of the dominant voice among psychologists is found in an article in which the chief mental health officer of the IDF is described as saying that “the IDF has turned from a body that automatically spits out weak people to an organization that extends its hand and gives legitimacy to tears”28.

TRÀUMA, CRITICAL FORMULATIONS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

Psychological language, especially one turning people into passive victims of circumstances, is often used to defuse criticisms. One example is the reaction to a mother who harshly criticized the IDF when her son was killed in a game of Russian roulette 29. Through turning her into a “crazy” person because of her intense bereavement, the IDF attempted to silence her condemnation. Indeed, the fact that she committed suicide on her son’s grave only strengthened the attribution that it was mental instability that lay at bottom of her disparagement of the IDF. An institutional expression of this pattern is related to the fact conscientious objectors are very rarely recognized by Israeli authorities and it was only in the late 1990s that special committees were established to grant such referrals. Yet even after establishing these committees the IDF still makes great efforts to reduce the number of conscientious objectors. The most common pattern is for these individuals to receive exemption via a psychiatric discharge: a psychological reason is substituted for an ideological one.

Notice how similar these processes are to how the “therapeutic motif” contained American Vietnam veterans as political opposition. This motif “renders veterans harmless by casting them in terms of metaphors of psychological dysfunction, emotional fragility, healing and personal redemption; it effectively silences the voice of the veteran as a source of legitimate knowledge about the nature of contemporary warfare, thus

subverting a potentially effective challenge to discourses advocating the use of ‘legitimate’ state-sanctioned violence.” By drawing attention to the suffering of individuals the motif distracts us from wider concerns about the uses of war. But while in America, large parts of society recognized collective wrongdoing, faced up to old accounts and made amends for past wrongs by asking for forgiveness, the dynamic in Israel is different because of the ongoing conflict. While there is an individualization and victimization of soldiers, there is also a move – during the last two Intifadas and the Second Lebanon War – to traumatize and treat the (predominantly Jewish) population. Sentiments of victimhood and the memory of trauma are basic elements in national identity and the creation of solidarity. Thus, placing the self-as-victim at the center of attention blinds many Israeli Jews from seeing the ‘other’ and how another people are occupied. In an ironic manner, the therapeutic discourse has not only equalized the Israeli and Palestinian cases but in fact inverts them by turning (Jewish) Israelis into victims.

**Organizational Psychology: Rationalizing Violence**

The third discourse is rooted in organizational psychology. It too has rather substantial historical roots although its concrete manifestations in Israel are more recent. Historically, psychology in the military first developed out of a confluence of therapeutic care for shell-shocked soldiers and organizational sorting of recruits to different units and arms and later began to encompass other areas such as training or psychological warfare. In Israel military psychology began to be institutionalized in the War of Independence and today can be found, as in the American armed forces, in a variety of guises in all branches of the military as well as the IDF’s School of Leadership.

**A Division of “Psychological Labor”**

A good starting point is the “psychological” division of labor in the IDF marked by a distinction between “mental health officers” (kabanim) and “psychologists”

---

31 Ibid.
The former term is used for therapists while the latter designates professionals who administer psychological tests or are organizational consultants. In fact, over the past decade hundreds of these consultants have entered the various branches of the IDF. The difference between the roles is institutional: the mental health officers are under the command the Chief Medical Officer and the organizational consultants are under the Department of Behavioral Sciences. No less important, while the former are committed use the therapeutic discourse, the latter are devoted to the organizational discourse focused on improved effectiveness and efficiency.

The manner by which the two roles reason about war-making is instructive. Within the discourse of the organizational psychologists one does find reference to combat. Yet, rather than formulating the problem of combat in terms of violence, their emphasis is on finding ways to improve performance given the severe pressures it entails. Indeed, violence, or its synonyms, does not appear at all in this discourse. Take a typical article about leadership which develops a model of stress placed on soldiers in fire-fights\textsuperscript{33}. In this model violence is “translated” into pressures on individual soldiers and through that linked to such variables as control or efficiency of the military organization.

Violence does come up in the therapeutic discourse of mental health officers. The title of a book drawing a causal link between war and its psychological implications is “The Stress of Combat, The Combat of Stress: Caring Strategies Towards Ex-Service Men and Women”\textsuperscript{34}. Whereas in battles violence is wrought on others and experienced by soldiers themselves, in the post-traumatic literature the stress is almost wholly on the latter aspect. Accordingly, what is of interest is the violence inflicted on soldiers, or its long-term implications for the soldiers themselves. The problematics of effecting violence are individualized by turning soldiers into victims rather than perpetrators. In this way the division of psychological labor is put into practice: the behavioral sciences departments deal with danger and a general model of stress while the psychiatric units deal with the effects of violence on soldiers as victims. While the key question in the organizational literature is that of combat effectiveness in the therapeutic literature it that of recuperation.


SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT

Psychology has been central in the two major twentieth century approaches to management: scientific and humanistic management. While the former attempts to measure and coordinate the activity of employees through statistical information, the latter centers on motivating employees through leadership and human relations. Both variants exist in the IDF. As in other militaries, so in the IDF, scientific management is part of “co-optive rational control” carried out by matching soldiers to machines through testing, and the precise measurement of performance so that it can be predicted. The underlying idea is to gauge to what extent people can be recruited to effectively perform military roles (for instance, the motor skills necessitated by pilots or the emotional stamina needed by sea commandos).

Another example concerns motivation that was a burning issue during the 1990s and comes up every few years. What is interesting is that psychological explanations were mobilized to account for the purported lack of motivation among some groups in the IDF. For example, a former head of the IDF’s Behavioral Sciences Department was the first to raise the issue and to pronounce that “[t]he change is from a notion in which the individual serves the establishment and ideology to one in which the role of the ideology and the establishment is to serve the individual” In phrasing the matter in this way, this expert formulates the problem as one centering on what impels soldiers to serve: self-actualization or ideological commitment. From our perspective, framing the issue as one of “motivation” draws attention away from the fact that this is an organization specializing in violence.

HUMANISTIC MANAGEMENT: “SOFT” SOLDIERING

An example of humanistic management is the new system instituted in Paratroopers’ basic training which offers strong contrasts to the older one that included degradations and humiliations. Gone, according to the article reporting on the new system, are the mortifications, the shouting NCOs, and the incessant physical and emotional burdens.

36 Ibid., p. 89.
38 Alex Fishman, “After Me to Summer Camp”, Haaretz, September 10, 1999 (Hebrew).
In its place soldiers are trained according to systematically gradated programs of exertion. They are explicitly told about pressures facing them and the difficulties of entering the military from civilian life. Enlistees know their individual rights and plans for the course of training. Moreover, the system is accompanied by tests and questionnaires focusing on ‘morale’ and attitudes. The idea, again part of humanistic management, is that practices like questionnaires and interviews give soldiers (workers) a feeling that their needs and anxieties are being recognized and met.

**“JUST LIKE ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION”**

Common to the practices of organizational psychology is an assumed similarity between the army and other organizations. Organizational psychologists and consultants rarely direct their attention to the uniqueness of the military, its specialization in effecting violence. In other words, the military is treated within this discourse in the same manner as schools or businesses. In the American context, one commentator has called this the MBA approach to soldiering\(^{39}\), an approach in which bloodless euphemisms are used like “servicing” rather than “killing” the enemy. The discourse of organizational psychology thus obfuscates the fact that this is an organization specializing in violence.

To be sure, there is a much self-reflection within militaries but it to focus on managerial problems. Violence is trivialized again because a focus on such issues often means no real grappling with the price of violence and its victims, and the historical context perpetrating aggression. The primary aim of organizational psychology in the military (as in other organizations) is to aid in rationalizing performance, making troops more effective and efficient. Being mobilized for organizational aims and devoting attention to performance, the violent acts of the soldiers themselves are not scrutinized, they are sanitized and hidden away.

**CONCLUSION: SOME WIDER IMPLICATIONS**

Our contention is that the therapeutic, developmental and organizational discourses regarding military service and war are “effective” in normalizing war. By way of conclusion we deal with three normalizing mechanisms that cross-cut these discourses.

---

SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

Because Israel is torn by dissent and many of the hegemonic ideals are no longer automatically accepted, the common denominator linking many social groups has become human suffering associated with war. Along these lines for example, the Holocaust is now remembered less in heroic terms than through a stress on traumatic suffering. More widely, many Israelis emphasize universal aspects of human experience – pain and mourning – to escape contention and circumvent ideological splits. Suffering and mourning as bases of social solidarity create sentiments of equality in terms of dangers, fears, and the pain accompanying war. By placing individuals at its center and assuming universalistic criteria for assessing their pain, the therapeutic discourse silences the politics of identities, reproduces existing power relations, and reinforces the strength of the state. Commitment to the state, moreover, is strengthened through the developmental discourse which constructs a link between the individual life-course and military service as natural and taken-for-granted and validates the connection between maturation, adulthood and war. In addition, our argument has been complex: while at first glance, the discourse of trauma appears to de-militarize sources of social solidarity, it actually strengthens the idea of war as fate and the centrality of the national state.

SOCIAL HIERARCHY

While the traumatic discourse produces social solidarity around suffering and mourning it also creates an unquestioned hierarchy between those who have “paid” the price and those who have not. The contribution of psychological discourses to the stratification of men is expressed most clearly around the construction of military masculinity. Military service creates a hierarchy in which combat roles are defined as the apex for the inculcation of citizenship and membership. According to this conception, to be an Israeli in the “full” sense of the word implies that one has to be Jewish, male, serving in the military and then granted full membership in the Israeli collectivity. The three psychological discourses sustain the “superiority” of the combat soldier and define his version as hegemonic. The developmental discourse does this through granting scientific validity to the “natural universality” of this masculinity. The organizational discourse does this through stressing the functional improvement and professionalization of this masculine version. And the therapeutic discourse does this by establishing the social “authorization” given to it to voice the pain of war and express criticism.
Neutering Critical Discourse

At the same time as the traumatic discourse grants social sanction to voice criticism, all three discourses also neuter critical expressions about war and the military. The developmental discourse does this through de-contextualizing war while the organizational discourse neutralizes the violent dimension of the military organization. But it is chiefly the traumatic-therapeutic discourse that does this through defining (Jewish) Israelis as victims of power and not the wielders of power repressing another people. This discourse blurs the unequal power relations between Israel and its enemies and especially the Palestinians. It thereby situates Israelis and the Palestinians as equals in a manner that turns them into competitors for suffering as a symbolic resource. In an era in which the name of the game is the politics of victimhood, the traumatic discourse is, for many Israeli Jews, very effective in normalizing war and breaking down the dichotomies of good and evil, and of strong and weak. In this manner the psychological discourses that we have examined variously blur, conceal, sanitize, as well as naturalize issues related to violence thereby “normalizing” the reality and effects of war and war-making.

CHAPTER 5

MAMDA: AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY, STRUCTURE AND CHALLENGES

*Ofra Ben Ishai*¹

MAMDA - The Human Behavioral Science Department of the IDF

BACKGROUND

The Human Behavioral Science Department in the IDF (MAMDA) is an intra-military unit. The professional members of the department are attached to IDF units alongside the regular military echelons, reaching from combat field units to the GHQ. The IDF is the only military in the west that has such an intra military unit. In other security forces, the social behavioral science unit either belongs to the MOD or the military staff use civilian expertise on an ad hoc basis².

In Israel, the department was established in 1936 prior to the declaration of Israel’s statehood and prior to the establishing of the IDF. At its inception the unit was called Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and had two main missions: the first mission was to help the military that was at the moment of its birth, to choose and select its staff. The second mission was to create a survey unit that would monitor the civil population’s resilience and readiness in preparation for the struggle for independence³. The professional staff was based on Jewish psychologists and sociologists that immigrated to the emerging state of Israel from the US and the UK. Their professional knowledge and

---

¹ Dr. Col (res.) Ofra Ben Ishai. The Open University of Israel. Formerly the Head of the Human Behavioral Science Dept. (MAMDA), IDF and the Chief Instructor of the Israeli National Defense College (INDC), IDF. Benishai@post.bgu.ac.il


practice were based mainly on their experience as officers in the American and British army. As a result, the unit was built under the strong influence of the positivism and structural functionalism of American Sociology and Western occupational psychology. The theoretical basis which was used, mostly relied on Socialization Theory, Nation and State Building Theories and on Industrial and Organizational Psychology Theories.

With the establishment of the IDF in 1948, the unit changed its name to the psychology unit and was placed as part of the manpower directorate. The head of the unit, the chief psychologist (rank of lieutenant colonel) was the chief advisor to the GHQ in matters of human behavior. The professional members of the unit were responsible for designing the selection process for the IDF and the assessment process of the conscripts during their service. They also developed, based on the survey unit that existed in the pre-statehood period a very wide scale motivation monitoring system. This system was aimed at helping the military staff in adapting the young recruits to become soldiers. The system was also used to give the civil education authority and the citizens in general a kind of feedback about the motivation rate of the youth to become soldiers, warriors and officers in particular.

After the 1973 War a government committee was appointed to investigate the weakness and the poor performance of some of the IDF units during the war. They recommended adopting a significant change in the structure and mode of action of the psychology unit. The committee members were bothered by the fact that a few of the battle field units collapsed in light of the shocking surprise of the Yom Kippur War breaking out. In addition, the youngest commanders especially, lacked the ability and the experience to reconstruct the cohesion that was needed to get the unit quickly back to fighting. The

---

8 Gal conceptualized MAMDA’s responsibilities in this period as a “responsibility for social engineering”. Gal, “Morale, Cohesion and Military Readiness”.
9 The Agranat Commission (Hebrew: Vaadat Agranat) was a National Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate failings in the Israel Defense Forces in the Yom Kippur War.
committee indicated the need to place next to the command chain social psychology advisors that are expert in developing and sustaining military fighting cohesion\textsuperscript{11}. As a result, the psychology unit evolved from a small HQ unit into a professional corps. Human Behavioral Science Officers were placed in all the military units, regular and reserve\textsuperscript{12}, to enable them to act in a close direct relationship and work daily and hand in hand with the chain of command\textsuperscript{13}.

The implementation of the committee recommendations brought about an unprecedented expansion of the unit. From a small body that contained a few dozen professional experts, the unit has become a large department with a few hundred human behavioral science officers. From that time on, its members have been enjoying a very close connection with the chain of command, with the soldiers themselves as well as a very high accessibility to the operational practice and to the battle field itself\textsuperscript{14}. As a result, in 1980 the unit changed its name from psychology unit to the Human Behavioral Science Department (in Hebrew, MAMDA) and the head of MAMDA is from now on a full Colonel and a full member of the general staff.

Throughout the years MAMDA maintained close relationships with the civil academic sphere\textsuperscript{15}. The Department has done many joint ventures with sociology and psychology researchers. The mutual relationship that exists between MAMDA and the universities works to the benefit of both sides: on one hand, the academic experts tutor the young officers on a regular basis and on the other hand the civilian researchers gained a greater accessibility to the military in comparison to the militaries in other countries. By this mutual relationship MAMDA ensures and empowers its high professional nature based on an updated theoretical knowledge and the best reliable practice.

\begin{flushright}

\textsuperscript{12} This phase was called “The Decentralization Phase”, U. Ben-Shalom and S. Fox, “Military Psychology in the Israel Defense Forces: A Perspective of Continuity and Change”, \textit{Armed Forces & Society}, Vol. 36-1, 2009, pp. 103-119.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Ibid.}


\end{flushright}
MAMDA publishes two professional journals, each of them 3 times a year. The first one—Military Psychology of Ground Warfare is dedicated to the social psychology dilemmas which are derived from the nature of army warfare and from the need of creating jointness between the army and the other branches of the service. The second journal Between the Spheres is dealing with sociological and psychological dilemmas which concern the GHQ and are focused mainly on strategic issues. From time to time MAMDA is publishing a book which summarizes its sociological and psychological understanding and main research findings about a specific issue that has deep influence on the IDF’s mode of action or legitimacy. The last one was a book that was published recently and has discussed the sociological and psychological aspects of military operations that are involved with an intensive friction with civilians as part of the asymmetric warfare\textsuperscript{16}.

**AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND STRUCTURE**

MAMDA has six areas of professional responsibility. In each of them the department is in charge of the knowledge development process, the creation of practices and tools as well as the development of the professional staff.

The first area of responsibility is the selection processes of the manpower to the military. The selection process includes cognitive and emotional evaluation, intelligence tests and educational classification, personality questioners, psychological testing, stress resistance simulations\textsuperscript{17} and occupational tendencies tests. The last ones have just been added recently\textsuperscript{18}. In addition, the candidates for military service undergo motivation rate interviews which aims to indicate who has the desire and the resilience to become a warrior and a commander\textsuperscript{19}. According to the law in Israel every teenager, boy or girl who is 17 years old receives a draft notice and is required to do all the tests\textsuperscript{20}. If a


candidate does not achieve the threshold which is needed he/she will be exempt from service. The achievement rate also determines if the person could become a candidate for the officer academy after one year in service.

Due to the mandatory service, the selection process in the IDF gives high priority to measures, which are derived mainly from the candidates’ biography before becoming soldiers. In other than volunteer militaries, which are dependent mainly on the supply and demand in the labor market and therefore often meet manpower shortages and have difficulties in filling the needs with suitable manpower, the mandatory service provides the IDF with all kinds of skills and qualifications. However, in recent years this situation is changing in Israel.

Based on a traditional political arrangement that was accepted in 1950 there are two groups of citizens in Israel that get collective exemption from service: the ultra-orthodox religious Jews (Haredim) and the Palestinian Israeli Arab minority. Because of the high birth rate that characterizes these two groups the total amount of candidates that are exempt from mandatory service has now reached approximately 40% of the total potential recruits. This rate is quite high and is expected to reach 50% of the total recruits by 2020. As a consequence, public debate has opened in Israel in recent years, about whether it is time to change the recruiting model and to move from a people’s...

23 Cohen, “After 60 Years Israeli Military to Replace Biased Classification Systems”.
army based on mandatory service to a professional military\textsuperscript{30}. The debate also brought about a few legislative attempts to set limits to the numbers of exemptions that the ultra-orthodox religious Jews would get\textsuperscript{31}. Even though the debate has not come to an end yet, it has already had a vast influence on the IDF selection process of manpower. The selection process has come lately to more and more resemble the occupational process in the civilian labor market\textsuperscript{32}. In other words, the IDF has been forced in recent years to adopt and develop occupational techniques which aim to raise its attraction for different groups and for particularistic sectorial values, aspirations, interests and beliefs \textsuperscript{33}. MAMDA is required to change the selection policy and to develop new methods and tools based on competitive and innovative occupational strategy\textsuperscript{34}.

The second area of responsibility is the assessment processes of the recruit and of the military staff during their service. The IDF has adopted a system of evaluation called 360-degree system\textsuperscript{35}. The logic of this system is to observe each officer and NCO from the lowest rank to the highest rank during their military career\textsuperscript{36}. The system is compiled of 5 different sources of evaluation. Each of them, except the last one, is collected once a year\textsuperscript{37}: the first component is the top – down evaluation i.e. Field commander evaluation and corps commander evaluation\textsuperscript{38}. The second component is the peer evaluation\textsuperscript{39} i.e.

\textsuperscript{38} https://www.idf.il/media/16773/320221.pdf (Hebrew).
mutual evaluations of officers of identical rank who evaluate each other. The third component is the subordinates’ evaluation i.e. how the soldiers and officers in one’s charge perceive their leadership style and managerial skills including their willingness to fight under their command and follow them into battle. The fourth component is the achievements assessment i.e. The scores that the units under one’s command got in professional inspections and of the unit’s results in periodical tests and various investigations. The last component of the 360-degree system is the future potential assessment i.e. The evaluation score that an officer has achieved in an assessment center test that checks his ability to advance in the ranks. Each officer is required to do two assessment center tests during his military career - the first one is to check his potential to become an intermediate level officer at a rank of lieutenant colonel and the second one is to check his ability to become a senior officer at the rank of full colonel.

In the promotion discussions which are taking place every year, the human behavioral science officer presents the 360-degree evaluation for every officer and a comparative evaluation between several officers who compete for a specific job.

The third area of responsibility is sociological research, especially research that examines the relationship between the IDF and civilian society. The sociological research unit is routinely monitoring the main trends, opinions and attitudes among the Israeli citizens, the media and the soldiers themselves toward the military. The survey includes monitoring, both on a routine basis and during times of war, the rate of trust the people in Israel express toward the senior command and the depth of the public belief in the legitimacy of the military operational mode of action.

---

40 https://www.idf.il/%D7%90%D7%AA%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A4%D7%A7%D7%93-%D7%99%D7%A9-%D7%9C%D7%99-%D7%A9%D7%90%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%94-%D7%96%D7%94-%D7%A1%D7%95%D7%A6%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%98%D7%A8%D7%99/ (in Hebrew).
42 Druk, Evaluation and Promotion in the IDF and in Other Militaries.
The fourth area of responsibility is concerned with the organizational development intervention and models and in trying to meet the challenges of implementing them in the unique military culture\(^{45}\). Human behavioral science officers posted in each division and brigade, implement all kinds of organizational interventions that are needed\(^{46}\), such as organizational diagnosis, team building processes, mental preparation workshops before and after fighting, resilience and cohesion building\(^{47}\), managerial tools and systemic planning methods and so on.

The fifth area is concerned with the military leadership development knowledge and practices. The IDF has a unique military leadership school that is specialized in the creation of unique models of military leadership\(^{48}\) that fit different command ranks and diverse missions\(^{49}\). The school is subordinate to the Educational Chief Officer but its professional staff – i.e. the social psychologists that constitute the school’s staff are appointed and are tutored by MAMDA. In the beginning of every new session on the training bases, the training instructors and their soldiers are coming for a 3 to 5-day workshop in the leadership school. The workshop is providing them with leadership orientation, skills and tools\(^{50}\).

The last area of responsibility is training development. In each corps and in each training base, there is a human behavioral science unit which is responsible for developing the training plan theoretically and practically. The training unit is designed to develop the


training knowledge and methods and instill the crucial training skills into the training staff\textsuperscript{51}. The unit is subordinate to the Corps Chief Officers, but its professional personnel is appointed and tutored by MAMDA.

**MAMDA’S PERSONNEL — CHARACTERISTICS, MODE OF ACTION AND TRAINING**

MAMDA’s personnel includes 3 different types of manpower: the first type includes the professional human behavioral science officers who have at least an MA in sociology or social /occupational psychology. The second type are human behavioral science assistants who have at least a BA in human behavioral science\textsuperscript{52}. The last type are NCO research and diagnostic apprentices. The apprenticeship is usually based on very high-quality soldiers who are doing their mandatory service as psych technical and research apprentices. To do so, they undergo a special training program which trains them in carrying out a psychological diagnostic interview and in implementing research methodology practices. The Human Behavioral Science Assistants and the Apprentices can work only under close and direct supervision of the Human Behavioral Science Officers and only as part of a professional framework.

Although the Human Behavioral Science Officers are subordinate to the regular military hierarchy, they are direct advisors to all ranks above them. As such they enjoy a relatively unlimited freedom to intervene according to their independent professional judgement without limitation caused by their junior military rank.

The Department recruits its Human Behavioral Science Officers mainly from the social science departments in the universities or from the professional labor market. Master's degree graduates who were officers in their mandatory service are preferable because of their familiarity with the military culture. Their previous experience as officers eases their adjustment to the military requirements and makes them more efficient and


\textsuperscript{52} This type of officers is part of the program which is called in Hebrew ATUDA ACADEMIT. This is a program of the Israeli Defense Forces which enables high school graduates to defer the draft, and instead allows them to attend university prior to their military service. After they complete their studies, they join the military and serve in a position that fits the professional knowledge they gained during their studies.
successful, especially in the battle field units. However sometimes their over familiarity with the military norms and habits becomes an obstacle because they are too obedient and are used to acting as conformists. To avoid and overcome these obstacles MAMDA has developed a unique military human behavioral science officer course and an obligatory six years training program that each of its officers must take. During the officer course and during the training program the Human Behavioral Science Officers permanently practice the logic of defamiliarization. The Human Behavioral Science Officers are required to explain and present the habits and the norms that are widespread in the military units and among the commanders in an unfamiliar or new way. The aim is to develop organizational awareness for the importance of keeping open minds and using innovative thinking on the battle field. In addition, during his first 4 years in service each Human Behavioral Science Officer is accompanied by a senior Human Behavioral Science Officer that tutors him and helps him to develop his professional ability and ethics.

**MAMDA’S STRUCTURE**

MAMDA’s structure is parallel to the military organizational structure. The department has 3 types of units: the first one is based on the territorial location and it is parallel to the military regional commands. There are Human Behavioral Science Units in The Northern Command, in The Central Command, in The Southern Command and in the Home Front Command. At the head of each regional unit is a Human Behavioral Science Officer with the rank of major except for the Human Behavioral Science Officer of the Home Front Command, who is at a rank of LT. Colonel. Under the command of each of the regional Human Behavioral Science Officer serve a few dozen Human Behavioral Science Officers which are placed among the regular and the reserve regional divisions and brigades.

---

53 In literature and other forms of artistic production: the effect or technique of disrupting the reader's or audience's habitual perception of the world and making familiar elements in a text, play, etc., seem strange and fresh, especially by means of drawing attention to the language or formal devices used. Later also more generally: the fact or process of rendering something unfamiliar. T. Eagleton, *How to Read a Poem*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007, pp. 49-52.
The second kind of units are the Human Behavioral Science Units in the 3 arms\textsuperscript{54} and in the 8 directorates\textsuperscript{55} of the IDF. In each arm and in each directorate, there are 3 kinds of Human Behavioral Science Units: The General Human Behavioral Science Unit, The Training Development Unit and The Manpower Selection and Evaluation Unit. The head of each unit is a lieutenant colonel and under his command serve a few dozen Human Behavioral Science Officers which are placed in every corps as well as in the arm and in the directorate headquarters.

The last kind of units are the Expert Units. There are 5 Expert Units that are parallel to the professional areas that MAMDA is responsible for: The Military Organizational Development Unit, The Military Sociological Research Unit, The Military Manpower Selection Unit, The Military Assessment and Evaluation Unit and The Military Leadership School. The head of each unit is a Human Behavioral Science Officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel and under his command serve a few dozen researchers and experts. Each of these Expert Units determines the policy in its area of expertise and directs the military on how to deal with issues concerning their expertise.

**MAMDA’s challenges**

Over the years MAMDA has faced many professional challenges and among them I have chosen to shed light on 3 main challenges. I specifically chose these three for a few reasons: first, they all have been caused by the intra – military identity of MAMDA. Second, they have enormous influence on MAMDA’s mode of action and on the relationship MAMDA maintains with its partners within the military and within the professional community. And finally all those 3 challenges cannot be treated by a simple clear-cut solution. Through the years they came to be issues that MAMDA must permanently deal with.

The first challenge is caused by the conflict that was developed two decades ago between the gender of many MA Graduates in human behavioral science and the masculine nature

\textsuperscript{54} Navy, Army, Air and Space.

\textsuperscript{55} Special Operations, Operations, Planning, Manpower, Intelligence, C4I & Cyber Defense, Technological and Logistics, Military Academies.
of the military organization. Since the 1990s most of the MA social science graduates at the universities are women. Traditionally the military culture norms and habits tend to be masculine and the organizational values advance and cherish the masculine attributes. Even though the military culture has changed over the years and become much more open and friendly toward a female’s considerations and needs, there is still a deep gap between the women’s expectations and the willingness of the military authorities to fulfill them. For example, the officers are expected usually to work from early morning until late at night. Essentially, they are expected to be on call 24/7 including on their vacation time. Female Human Behavioral Science Officers especially if they are mothers, express great difficulties in meeting these expectations.

I will try to illustrate the conflict by giving an extreme example: in 1991 during the First Gulf War Israel was attacked by Iraqi rockets and Israeli citizens were instructed by the home front command to remain near shelters and to keep their gas masks at hand. The civilian educational system was shut down, the pupils stayed at home and many workplaces stopped operating since their employees had to stay at home and watch after their children’s safety. The military bases were also targets for the Iraqi rockets. Even though the IDF had not taken any active participation in the war, the GHQ decided to raise the operational alertness of the military to its highest level. Therefore, all officers were told to stay on their bases for a very long time without seeing their families. At that time on one of the military training bases a female Human Behavioral Science Officer was serving. She was a mother to new born twins 5 months old. She was very anxious as to the ability of her husband to take care of the twins by himself during the bombing, so she asked for permission to go home every evening. The base commander, a woman by the way, refused the request and ordered her to stay. Her reasons for the refusal were double: The commander thought that during war time there is a real necessity for a Human

---

Behavioral Science Officer’s presence and advice. In addition, during war time the officers are required to set an example to the soldiers by overcoming their personal difficulties. The Human Behavioral Science Officer decided to defy the order and left the base without permission. The base commander intended to sentence her to military prison but in the end after the head of MAMDA had intervened, the officer was released from her duty. The release was accompanied by a formal decision to immediately fire her and terminate her service.

Even though it was an extreme case, it helps us to figure out the difficulties MAMDA must overcome to mediate between the military norms and the characteristics of MAMDA’s personnel. The clash is prominent especially in matters of working times, night rosters, and the comprehensive obligations that any officer must obey, including the request to exhibit total responsibility that in many times and cases exceeds the professional obligation’s boundaries.

The second challenge that MAMDA must deal with is connected to the conflict that was developed between the changing nature of the war and the political orientation that usually characterized the sociological and psychological communities. Since 1987 Israel and the IDF have been engaged in an asymmetric warfare with the Palestinians. In contrast to previous no choice wars perception that was common among Israeli citizens between 1948 to 1982, the asymmetric war against the Palestinians inflames a deep controversy in the Israeli society. While the right-wing supporters perceive the war against the Palestinians as a part of the continuous existential struggle of Israel to maintain its sovereignty, the left-wing supporters perceive it as a war of choice. The leftists prefer to give preference to the political negotiations and to put the main efforts in advancing peace dialogue. The deep controversy penetrates to the military and arouses difficult

dilemmas about the necessity of the military actions as well as their efficiency and most of all their morality. The political debate is widespread particularly in the reserve units.

These influences are much more salient among Human Behavioral Science Officers. The majority of the Human Behavioral Science professionals in Israel belong to the central-left wing and in general prefer to solve conflicts by peaceful means and dialogue. They are much more critical of the use of military aggression and many of them take part in the current pacifist protests. MAMDA must face again and again situations, especially among its reserve officers, that the tension between the missions demands and their political views reduce the ability to provide a proper professional service. Moreover, the reserve Human Behavioral Science Officers that were called to active service in the occupied territories have conditioned their willingness to serve by the request to maintain their right of freedom of speech. They insist on having the right to share with the public their impressions of the far flung implications that the military mode of action in the occupied territories creates.

Again, I’ll try to illustrate the tense situations by giving an extreme example. In 1989 during the first Intifada the first uprising of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The uprising lasted from December 1987 until the Madrid Conference in 1991.

Even though the conclusions were presented by MAMDA to IDF Chief of Staff, the two officers stood by their right to

---

71 The first uprising of the Palestinians against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The uprising lasted from December 1987 until the Madrid Conference in 1991.
publish their findings in the media to raise public awareness to the implications of the military occupation. They claimed that the publication is an inherent part both to their moral commitment as citizens and to their professional ethics as social psychologists. Despite having been forbidden, right after they had finished their active duty they published their report in the newspapers. The publication inflamed a public turbulence and the military was attacked by all sides of the political continuum. The public turbulence aroused deep anger and criticism toward MAMDA's Officers and against what was called their lack of loyalty. A call was even heard to dismantle the whole department. At the end, The Chief of Staff commanded the Head of MAMDA to permanently release the two psychologists from service.

Even though the case was apparently ended by that decision, its bad implications never disappeared. From that time on, a hidden suspicion was created toward MAMDA both in the military and in the professional community. On the one hand a latent suspicion was planted among the GHQ toward MAMDA's loyalty and on the other hand the sociology and psychology communities became skeptical about MAMDA’s autonomy to maintain professional principles and ethics. Over the years the conflict calmed down and MAMDA succeeded in rehabilitating its relationship both with the military and with the professional community. But whenever a dispute arises regarding publication of materials from MAMDA's research or in regard to the participation of MAMDA's officers in professional civil conferences, the latent suspicion is awakened and MAMDA must be very sensitive and put vast efforts into containing the conflicts and mitigating the tensions.

The last challenge I’m going to address is concerned with the deep disciplinary change that has occurred in the human behavioral science departments at the Israeli universities. Since the nineties, critical sociologists have started to move from the fringes of the academic establishment to the center, and their views have come to dominate the social sciences. The critical sociology became a powerful engine of radical ideology on Israeli

---


campuses\textsuperscript{76} and the theories that were advanced by its supporters, which include post
colonialism\textsuperscript{77}, neo Marxism\textsuperscript{78}, radical and liberal feminism\textsuperscript{79}, post modernism\textsuperscript{80} and most
of all anti-militarism\textsuperscript{81}, have become the new academic political correctness\textsuperscript{82}.

The new Human Behavioral Science Officers that joined MAMDA since the nineties,
replaced their traditional functionalistic theoretic basis with a critical world view\textsuperscript{83}. The
critical Human Behavioral Science Officers perceived themselves as an agency of human
rights and social equality and they aspired to use their profession as a voice for the benefit
of the under privileged groups in the IDF and for helping the disadvantaged people of
Israel\textsuperscript{84}. It was just a matter of time until a deep conflict broke out between the Critical
Human Behavioral Science Officers and the conservative mainstream command. The
dispute has also split MAMDA to 2 camps around many fundamental questions like who
its main client is- the military organization or Israeli society? To whom are MAMDA’s
officers obligated – to the military organizational interests or to the public good? What
should MAMDA do whenever the two clash?

From these complicated questions a range of conflicted issues arose regarding the
preferable military model, to the ways to implement social equality in the military without
harming the operational ability, to the dilemmas about women’s integration on the battle
field, to the attitude of the military toward minorities and LGBT members, to the military
policy against conscience and political refusal and many more.

\textsuperscript{77} Ram, \textit{Israeli Sociology}, pp, 125-145.
\textsuperscript{78} U. Ram, “Sociology in the Age of Netanyahu: Critical Trends in Israeli Sociology in the Beginning
\texttt{http://azure.org.il/include/print.php?id=232}.
\textsuperscript{80} Ram, \textit{Israeli Sociology}, pp, 105-124.
\textsuperscript{81} S. Carmi and H. Rosenfeld, “The Emergence of Militaristic Nationalism in Israel”, \textit{International
\textsuperscript{82} Epstein, “The Decline of Israeli Sociology”.
\textsuperscript{83} Z. Lehrer and S. Amram-Katz, “The Sociology of Military Knowledge in the IDF: From Forging to
\textsuperscript{84} Y. Ben-Horin, S. Givoli, A. Vainer, O. Vinshel, A. Tuv, R. Tamir, Z. Yaffe, T. Peled, M. Rosenstein,
and Y. Sher, \textit{The New Military Human Behavioral Science expertise: New Logic and New Conceptual
Framework}, Tel Hashomer: IDF BSC, 2002 (Hebrew).
To restrain the conflict MAMDA had created in 2003 a new concept. The new concept that was called The Functional Critical Model[^85], offered the Human Behavioral Science Officers a new middle way to bridge their commitment to advancing social values and their obligation toward the military organization. By the new definition the Human Behavioral Science Officer is now expected to be an active agency who is striving to influence the military mode of action by critical theories[^86].

The attached comparative table (Table 1) is summarizing the main differences between the new concept and the traditional one. It is important to emphasize that there isn’t a black and white division between the two. Rather it is a continuum of thin nuances and emphasis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>The Traditional Concept</th>
<th>The Functional Critical Model (The new concept)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Motive for Action</td>
<td>The military organization’s rationale</td>
<td>The professional rationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(how MAMDA is choosing what to do and how it sets priorities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Mission</td>
<td>Acting on behalf of the military organization and command needs and interests</td>
<td>Acting on behalf of the public good.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(the purpose and the meaning of MAMDA’s activity)</td>
<td>Patriotism</td>
<td>Liberal and humanitarian values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Belonging</td>
<td>Part of the Military staff</td>
<td>Part of a virtual Human Behavioral Science community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does MAMDA define its main identity and what is the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>nature of the relationship that MAMDA maintains with the military organization)</strong></th>
<th>Organic assimilation /symbiosis</th>
<th>Dissimilarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Professional Intention</strong> (what are the desired goals and how does MAMDA evaluate its achievements)</td>
<td>Improving the military operational ability and maintaining the military legitimacy</td>
<td>Creating of new social future Transforming the military and Improving its adjustment to social changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Respect toward the past</td>
<td>Deconstructing the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Influence Space</strong> (how does MAMDA define the right space to execute its influence’s efforts)</td>
<td>Intra- military</td>
<td>Military – civil interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong> (in which language does MAMDA think and operate and how does MAMDA use the language to achieve influence)</td>
<td>Translating professional language to military language – motivation, readiness and willingness, resilience</td>
<td>Instill professional language into military language: discourse, narratives, social protest, masculine hegemony, power relations, identity culture, periphery and center, the struggle for hearts and minds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I want to conclude the review with a case study that elaborates both the complexity and the major contribution MAMDA’s new concept has brought and is still bringing to the IDF. In 2005 the Israeli government decided to carry out a disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip\(^{87}\). The decision inflamed a deep controversial dispute in Israeli society\(^{88}\). There was even a fear of civil war between the supporters and the opposers\(^{89}\).

The plan contains two different missions: the first one was the withdrawal of the IDF from inside the Gaza Strip\(^{90}\), and the second one was the dismantling of all Israeli settlements in the area and evacuating the settlers\(^{91}\). Whereas the first mission was a typical militaristic mission and the IDF was quite skilled and had long experience with executing such missions, the second mission was much more complicated.

The modern democratic national state usually maintains a sharp separation between the military which is responsible for guarding the borders and to fight external enemies and the police forces which are responsible for keeping civil order\(^{92}\). Usually the military has no civilian jurisdiction within the civilian sphere\(^{93}\). This separation is much more significant when the military is based on mandatory service and therefore must keep its

---

87 The Israeli disengagement from Gaza (Hebrew: Tokhnit HaHitnatkut) also known as Gaza expulsion was the withdrawal of the Israeli army from inside the Gaza Strip, and the dismantling of all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005.
90 [https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israel%20Disengagement%20Plan-%202005.aspx](https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israel%20Disengagement%20Plan-%202005.aspx)
neutral and apolitical image\textsuperscript{94}. Nevertheless, after long discussions the Israeli government had decided that the mission of dismantling the settlements and evacuating the settlers would be executed by the military. The IDF was in deep confusion – it was ordered to use its power against its own Israeli citizens. The GHQ was mainly troubled by the call of the national religious leaders to their soldiers to oppose the evacuation orders and to refuse to take part in the mission\textsuperscript{95}.

MAMDA was asked to help the GHQ to build a strategy which would help the military to accomplish the two missions without creating non-repairable fragmentation between the state, the military and the national religious sector in Israel.

MAMDA built a think tank which was based on Senior Human Behavioral Science Officers in regular and in reserve service. Among them there were well-known social psychologists and sociologist that were experts in coping with social resilience, dealing with civilian objection and resistance as well as coping with military refusal.

The think tank had created a strategy under a hybrid logic that was called – “with sensitivity and with determination”\textsuperscript{96}. The meaning of that strategy was to equip the forces with an operational consciousness that was based on a combination of two complementary contrasting principles. On one hand the mission commanders and their soldiers were instructed to treat the evacuated settlers as their brothers and sisters. On the other hand, the obligation of implementing the government directive was presented as the most holy and crucial obligation of any military in a democratic state\textsuperscript{97}.

This Strategy was translated into operational logic and practices. All the Human Behavioral Science Officers who accompanied the fighting forces to their mission


assimilated this logic among the commanders and among the soldiers as part of an operational preparation process\textsuperscript{98}. Furthermore, following one of the think tank’s recommendations the Israel national flag was stitched to the uniforms to show the settlers and the soldiers the double logic they had to obey.

The soldiers were instructed to help the settlers by packing their belongings and carrying them, as well as to help to alleviate the young children’s fears. During the operation, soldiers went into settlers’ homes and presented them with removal decrees but at the same time the IDF arranged crews of social nurses and psychologists to support the children. The soldiers shared with the children tabletop games, sweets and candies\textsuperscript{99}.

One of the most effective recommendations MAMDA’s think tank gave the GHQ was concerning the evacuation tactics. To avoid an escalation of refusal by the soldiers that are coming from settlers’ families the think tank had suggested an evacuation cycles tactic. According to that tactic the soldiers that were potential refusers were put in the last evacuation cycle and essentially didn’t have any direct contact with the settlers\textsuperscript{100}.

Finally, and maybe the most prominent recommendation MAMDA think tank gave the GHQ was concerned with the creating of a national crisis consciousness among the public, the media and especially among the evacuated settlers. The evacuation zone was declared a closed theatre to the media or to people that were not residents of the settlements. By that action the military expressed its readiness and determination to enforce the government decision\textsuperscript{101}.

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Ibid.}
In the end, although the process was difficult and even traumatic, the mission was accomplished --there were only a few wounded people among the evacuated population and the sovereignty of the government was safeguarded. Without being an organic and inherent part of the IDF and without acting according to its new concept MAMDA could not have made such a crucial contribution to the ability of the IDF to achieve its mission.

Summing up, during the Asymmetric Warfare and the Global War against Terror, the military’s missions have become much more complicated and controversial. Gaining legitimacy for using military forces is quite often under deep dispute and it is frequently torn between clashing liberals and nationalistic ideologies. In such a climate the ability of the military to develop flexible and complicated operational doctrines and practices is becoming a crucial challenge. Gaining international support and sustaining internal legitimacy forces the military to adapt quickly to emergent social and political changes. At the same time and for the same reason the military has become in recent years much more cautious and suspicious toward external interventions. The presence of an in-house human behavioral science unit which has a deep relationship with the chain of command, is enjoying the commander’s trust and has long acquaintance with the military problems and dilemmas, is almost the only way to influence the designing of military policy and decision making process. Furthermore, the in-house presence raises the

chance that the sociological and psychological updated knowledge and practices will actually advance the military’s adjustment to the social needs and to the public will.
CHAPTER 6

FAMILY SUPPORT AND GENDER POLICY IN THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCES —A CASE STUDY OF JGSDF FAMILIES¹—

Hitoshi Kawano

National Defense Academy

INTRODUCTION

The Japan Self-Defense Forces has more than a quarter century of Family Support history. Since 1992, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has participated in UN Peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Golan Heights, Rwanda, East Timor, and most recently in Haiti and South Sudan. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) have also been involved in the above mentioned UN operations by providing logistical support services. In total, over 27,000 JSDF personnel have been deployed overseas. The initial focus for family support by JGSDF was on during-deployment measures to support the JGSDF families whose family members were sent overseas for 6 months on a UN peacekeeping mission. In 2002, the first female SDF personnel participated in the UN peacekeeping operation in East Timor.

After 9.11, JGSDF sent troops for humanitarian assistance operation in Iraq (2004-06). That is when the family support program was enhanced, although the 3-month rotation in Iraq was much shorter than the ordinary 6-month rotation for a UN peacekeeping operation. As a result, the Family Support Section, Ground Staff Office, JGSDF Headquarter in Tokyo, was established in 2007.

¹ The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not represent any official position held by the Japan Self-Defense Forces or Ministry of Defense.
After the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, JGSDF seemed to shift its focus on peace-time family support. Due to the fact that more than 100,000 JSDF personnel involved in the largest-ever domestic disaster relief operation in the history of JSDF, and increased operational tempo in terms of both international and domestic operations, as well, there were growing operational needs for family support.

In this chapter, the historical development process of family support programs is examined first, and then, the current situation of implementation of family support programs, its perceived family support needs, its issues of trust and self-efficacy, and the perception of effectiveness of the programs are explored based on the 2015 JGSDF family survey and interview results. In addition, the historical process of gender policy development, and the socio-cultural context of changing family structure are briefly overviewed.

FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS BY JGSDF

By observing the latest developments of the family support policies by JGSDF, it seems to me that a sort of paradigm shift is taking place, from just a part of the welfare program for the families of deployed personnel to more emphasis on operational readiness and effectiveness. The 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) clearly states that family support programs are to be enhanced. The new concept of ”Dynamic Joint Defense Force” requires “Creation of Tough & Resilient JGSDF.” Also, the document published by Family Support Section, GSO, says, “Family Support” constitutes the basis for Operational Effectiveness by assuring the SDF personnel sense of family safety, enhanced motivation, and comprehensive care from induction to retirement,” and they believe that “(t)he less worried the JGSDF personnel are, the more committed they are to their mission.” However, there were limited public/self-help available a few years ago, and JGSDF is seeking further mutual help in collaboration with civilian or veteran SDF support networks.

2 This concept of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” proposed in the 2013 NDPG was replaced by the “Multi-Domain Defense Force” concept in the 2018 NDPG, which emphasizes cross-domain operational capabilities including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. See Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2019, Ch. 3, Section 2. https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2019/DOJ2019_2-3-2.pdf

3 For further information, see the following site of JGSDF: https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/english/roles/index.html.
JGSDF classifies 3 types of family support:

1) **Self-Help** includes family communication cards which include emergency contact information, family support DVDs, information sharing through the JGSDF-Web pages, and family support education at the unit-level.

2) **Mutual Help** includes civil-support by SDF-Family Assn, SDF Veterans Assn., etc. In particular, SDF-Family Association is actively supporting JGSDF families by offering support for ordinary life-support needs, safety-check of family members, elder-family care, child-care, financial and other social support counseling in case of a major disaster relief operation. Following the American idea of “family readiness group”, JGSDF has started developing “Unit-Family Communities” based on the local JGSDF units’ own initiatives by hosting BBQ parties, new family orientations, family visit days on base, and other public events involving their family members.

3) **Public Help** includes emergency call-up support (babysitting/child-care service by JGSDF/local govt.), and other formal-institutional family support measures.

The point is, the program is to enhance operational effectiveness, not just an ordinary family support welfare program.

On May 18, 2017, a landmark family support agreement was signed by Gen. Okabe, then-Chief of Staff, JGSDF, and the Presidents of SDF Veterans Association and SDF Family Association. Although there were some bilateral agreement with either association at a local level in the past, this major agreement at the central level further promoted similar agreements at the local level.

As a result, the number of Family Support Agreements by JGSDF bases and local cities/towns is increasing. In case of a large-scale earthquake, or other types of natural disaster including flooding, landslides, etc., JGSDF units would be mobilized for disaster relief operations. In order to prepare for an emergency Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operation, the contents of agreement typically include:

1) On-base temporary child-care facilities supported by local cities
2) Arrangement of civilian child-care services for the GSDF families by local cities
3) Municipal support for elder-care service
4) Consultation for health care and medical treatment of the GSDF families
For instance, Yokosuka City in Kanagawa Prefecture, also signed a family support agreement in 2017 with all three JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF bases in town, in case of a large-scale natural disaster. This is rather a rare case involving three services of SDF. However, the scope of family support network is steadily expanding all over Japan.

**THE 2015 JGSDF FAMILY SUPPORT STUDY: RESULTS AND CHALLENGES**

A several years ago, we argued that family support programs offered by JGSDF were still under development. In recognition of necessity for a comprehensive and interdisciplinary study on JGSDF family support programs, a social research was conducted in 2015. In the following section, some of survey results are presented, and theoretical and empirical implications are discussed.

Our research questions were as follows:

1) Is "Community Capacity Model" applicable to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) families?

2) To what extent is "community capacity" developed? Is it functioning effectively? Are there any regional differences?

3) JGSDF family support programs: How well are they working at the local level? Are there any regional differences?

---


5 This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI (Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research) Grant Number 26380660.

The premise of the Community Capacity Model is that in a given local community the more the community has “community capacity”, which consists of two major elements of social capital\(^7\): *shared responsibility* and *collective competence* among the members of the community, the better well-being of the community members, including military families. Developing social capital through establishing formal systems of family support and enhancing informal networks of social support is critically important factor in building community capacity\(^8\). Our research interest is based on this premise, while assuming that this model is valid for the case of JGSDF families and their living communities.

1. **Research Methods**

1) JGSDF Family Survey

JGSDF consists of 5 Area Armies: Northern, North-Eastern, Eastern, Central, Western Armies. As for sampling, 200 families are stratified according to the overall ratio of officers, non-commissioned officers, and private personnel, and randomly selected from the stratified groups within each Army. Each family received 2 questionnaires, one for GSDF personnel and another for their spouse, parent, or sibling. In total, 2000 questionnaires were distributed in December 2015. By the end of March 2016, 1894 valid questionnaires were returned, which means 94.7% of response rate.

2) JGSDF Family Interviews

We also conducted interviews of GSDF families from September to November in 2015. In order to cover every Area Army district, we visited the following 15 camps, and interviewed 55 families in total (see Figure 1):

1. Northern Army (Hokkaido): Okadama (Sapporo City), Higashi-Chitose (Chitose City), Obihiro (Obihiro City)
2. North-Eastern Army: Aomori (Aomori City), Sendai and Tagajo (Sendai City)
3. Eastern Army: Nerima (Tokyo), Omiya (Saitama Pref.), and Somagahara (Gunma Pref.)
4. Central Army: Okubo (Uji City, Kyoto Pref.), Fukuchiyama (Fukuchiyama City,

---


\(^8\) Bowen et al., “Community Capacity and the Psychological Well-being of Married United States Air Force Members”.
2. SURVEY RESULTS

1) Family Support Needs
To the question, “How important, do you think, the social support is for GSDF families?”, most families recognized the importance of family support by replying “very important” (49.6%), and “somewhat important” (42.1%). However, as to the formal family support system of GSDF, only 7.7% considered that a “sufficient system is established”, while 40.1% replied “to some extent”, and 23.6% believed that it’s “not good enough.”

When they are asked “How often did you need family support?”, 6.9% replied “frequently”, and 40.9% needed it “sometimes.” When did they need the family support? Most common answer is when their “GSDF spouses were mobilized for disaster relief operations” for long (52.9%), and next common answer is when their “GSDF spouses left...
for a military exercise” for a while (30.9%), followed by the answer “when the family was victimized by natural disaster” (25.7%). Wives of GSDF personnel are in need of support when their husbands are away from home to take part in “professional military schooling” (31.7%; female: see Figure 2).

Figure 2  Family Support Needs

When a GSDF family needs support, what types of support do they need?

Figure 3 shows the answers to the question, “In your opinion, what types of family support are needed?” Most needed type of support was “checking out family safety after a natural disaster” (“very much” and “somewhat”: 96.4%), followed by “information sharing and communication support during the GSDF overseas operations” (92.1%), “family support orientations before/during GSDF overseas operations” (89.0%), “(mental/civil) aftercare for the deployed GSDF personnel and families” (87.0%), and “childcare support during emergency call-up” (85.3%). On the other hand, the least needed type of family support was “unit-family community activities” (59.2%).
2) Family Support Provider

When GSDF families need support, whom can they actually turn to for help?

Figure 4 shows the answers to the question, “When you are in need of help, whom can you ask for help and family support?” Most likely, they would turn to “non-resident family members (e.g. parents, siblings)” for help (“very easy [to ask for help]” and “relatively easy”: 80.1%), followed by “personal friends” (62.2%), and “colleagues at work” (60.8%). This result suggests that, for GSDF families, needed support is most likely provided by informal networks of their own family members and personal friends.

On the other hand, formal support providers, such as Ministry of Defense, Self-Defense Forces, local/municipal governments, as well as community/neighborhood or SDF-related associations, remain much less likely to be counted on.
This fact suggests that the GSDF families’ sense of “particularized trust” far exceeds that of “generalized trust.” As a series of social psychological experiments and social surveys conducted by Yamagishi and others suggest, the Japanese people tend to have less generalized trust than the Americans, and also the Japanese tend to maintain committed relationship with reliable partners in order to avoid troubles caused by social uncertainties⁹.

In fact, as Figure 5 shows the result of our survey question on “particularized trust”, the GSDF families trusted “non-resident family members” highest (“[trust] very much”; 57.2%), whereas “non-work related friends” (24.2%), “work-related friends” (22.0%), “Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces” (19.9%) are trusted much less, and further less trusted are “local/municipal governments” (8.1%), “SDF-related associations” (7.1%), “community/neighborhood associations” (5.1%), and “volunteer/sports/civil

---

associations” (3.8%).

3) Sense of Community
Contrary to the premise of Community Capacity Model, the following data suggest that the communities in which the GSDF families live do not share the sense of strong commitment to improve their communities among the residents.

Figure 6 shows the answers to the question, “To what extent, do you agree or disagree with the statement: there is a shared commitment to improve community among residents?” Only a few percent of respondents “strongly agree” to the statement, while there are some generational and regional differences. In terms of gender, there is almost no difference among the “strongly agree” response (4.6% male, 4.2% female), though the positive answer including both “strongly agree” and “somewhat agree” shows that men are slightly more positive than women (45.6% male, 42.0% female).
As for the generational gap, the older generations tend to answer positively than younger generations (60’s 62.2%, 50’s 51.1%, 40’s 49.7%, 30’s 39.7%, 20’s 36.5%). However, this may be because of the difference in terms of length of residence in the same neighborhood since the younger generations tend to frequently relocate due to the GSDF personnel’s job assignments.

It is also interesting to note that there is regional difference, suggesting that the West and Central areas share stronger sense of commitment to improve their communities than the other areas. In particular, contrary to a common sense understanding of supposedly higher degree of “community capacity” in the Northern Army area, the survey result shown below suggests it is not the case.  

Figure 6  Sense of Community: Shared Commitment

4) Self-Efficacy of GSDF Families
“Self-efficacy” refers to an individual's belief in his or her capacity to execute behaviors

---

10 In Hokkaido, where the Northern Army of GSDF covers, some local cities strongly supported the GSDF units and their families while the units were deployed overseas for the UN peacekeeping missions or humanitarian assistance operations in Iraq (H. Kawano, “Jieiita no Kazoku-Shien [Family Support by JSDF], 2015, Japanese).
necessary to produce specific performance attainments or desired effects. As it was suggested in the Family Support Provider section above, the GSDF families trust and rely on their own family members, most likely their parents, or grandparents of their children, to take care of the children when they needed help. Figure 6 shows the answer to the question, “When you are called-up for emergency operation, who can take care of your child?” The overwhelming majority answers that “grandparents” take care of their children. In particular, more than 70% of the GSDF families in their 20’s and 30’s would ask the grandparents to take care of their children. This result is consistent with the findings in other studies on military families that “service members’ parents are an important component of military families, particularly among the younger military personnel. 12"

**Figure 7 Self-Efficacy: Who Takes Care of Your Child in Emergency**

![Chart showing who takes care of children in emergency](chart.png)


3. GSDF FAMILY INTERVIEW RESULTS

1) Eroding Sense of Community and Importance of Self-Efficacy

In the following section, findings from the GSDF families are summarized. What we found from the result of those interviews can be most effectively summarized in the simple expression of “eroding sense of community” among the GSDF families. Contrary to the premise of Community Capacity Model, it seems that “community capacity” is rather losing relevance among the GSDF families despite organizational efforts made in order to develop effective family support system by GSDF. Unlike the countries with frequent deployment for combat operations, Japan has not engaged in any types of combat missions because of the Article 9 of the Constitution which renounces “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” As the “military of a nation that renounces war,” JSDF has no combat casualty since its establishment in 1954. Having engaged in mostly disaster relief and civil engineering operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and other types of military operations other than war, the post-war Japanese All Volunteer Force is not so “greedy institution” as the other nations’ military forces. On the other hand, a family as institution seems to have become “greedier” due to changing gender norms and empowerment of women in a post-modern society like Japan.

Among the 55 families we interviewed, 29 of them live in privately owned houses, 15 families rent apartments, and 11 families lived in GSDF official residence. Among those who live in official residence, there are networks of wives, or “mothers”, through various voluntary activities and social groups, including women’s division of the official residents’ association and/or local residents’ association, Parent-Teacher Associations of local primary and junior high schools, and other sports/athletic/hobby clubs. While some wives

---

13 Frederic and Masson also suggest that the once strong sense of military community, or the notion of “great military family” in the Argentine Armed Forces has been lost recently, while citing a comment by an Army officer pointing out that the notion of “one big family” has been lost. See S. Frederic & L. Masson, “Profession and the Military Family in the Argentine Armed Forces: Generational Differences and Socio-cultural Changes,” R. Moelker et al. eds., Military Families and War in the 21st Century, pp. 73-83.


enjoy keeping in touch with other wives living in their official residence, others feel obliged to make commitment to the close-knit networks of GSDF family wives, and as a result, tend to find off-base private housing so that they can get away from the psychological burden of GSDF networks. In addition, relationship among the GSDF families in the official residence is also changing, in particular in the urban areas. For instance, a wife of GSDF officer told us that there is almost no relationship among the residents of the GSDF official housing complex in the metropolitan Tokyo area, where hundreds of families live. Although there is a formal official residents’ association, personal relationship among the residents is “not so deep” compared to other official residences in different areas. Another wife suggests that since “a close relationship” is limited to only a few among the official residents, she turned to her personal friend and lived with the friend when her husband, GSDF NCO, was away from home for 4 month due to his professional military schooling for obtaining a MOS (Military Occupational Specialty). In local cities, a GSDF family would move out of the official residence, and build their own home, or rent an apartment, near their parents’ house so that they could get help when needed. As the survey result shown above suggests, their own parents are the ones whom they would turn to for help.

Another aspect of eroding sense of community is the fact that most GSDF families are skeptical about viability of the family safety check system in collaboration with the SDF Family Association and the SDF Veterans Association. While some GSDF families strongly support the idea of letting the members of those SDF-related associations go visit private homes of GSDF families and see if the family members are OK when a large-scale natural disaster occurs, others express concerns. The following cases show their concerns.

Case 1: Husband (40’s): GSDF Officer, Wife (30’s): GSDF NCO, 4 Children (Age 3-8)
This GSDF couple lived in the GSDF housing in Tokyo, but moved to their own new house 2 years ago. The husband is originally from Okinawa, and the wife is from Tokyo where her mother lives. In 2011, after the Great East Japan Earth Quake, the husband was mobilized for the disaster relief operation in Fukushima, which lasted for 9 months. He could not come back to home for the first 30 days. The wife, with 3 small pre-school children at home, kept working as GSDF enlisted woman at a unit in Tokyo. She asked

---

17 It was when she was pregnant with her first child. Since her parents had already passed away, her friend was the one whom she trusted most when she was in need of help (Interview #8).
her mother to take care of her 3 children. Her mother stayed at her GSDF housing for a week, and her mother kept helping her afterwards. The mother-in-law in Okinawa also helped her by sending diapers, toilet papers, milk, water, and other daily life necessities. Other GSDF female personnel living in the same GSDF housing also offered some help by sharing bottles of water, etc. However, based on their own experiences, the GSDF couple doubts effectiveness of family support collaboration with SDF Family Association and Veterans Association:

[Wife] We wonder if it’s possible for them (SDF-related association volunteers) to do “safety check” in a case like the 3.11 Great Earth Quake. We doubt it. In the end, a family takes care of its own family. Instead of asking someone else to do it, we’ve got to do it by ourselves. We need to strengthen family ties with other family members and relatives of our own 18 (emphasis added by Kawano).

The wife’s comment clearly shows the idea of “self-efficacy,” that is, “a family takes care of its own family” and a family needs to “strengthen one’s own family ties” in order to cope with family trouble. Although “collective competence” is an important element of the “community capacity model,” what her comment suggests seems to be relevance of the “family resilience” concept 19.

Case 2: Husband (30’s): GSDF NCO, Wife (30’s): Civilian Part-time Worker, 2 Children (Age 3-10)
This family lived in a rented apartment room when they got married, and later built their own new house in Hokkaido. Both of the couple are originally from Hokkaido, though in different cities. Their parents and families live mostly in Hokkaido. The husband agrees the idea of collaboration with SDF-related associations, but he has some reservation about sharing personal information of his own family with the volunteers whom he doesn’t know well:

[Wife] I don’t know if it’s a good idea or not. The personal information could be used for other purposes, can be misused.”

---

18 Interview #34.
19 “Family resilience” is defined as “the ability of the family, as a functional system, to withstand and rebound from adversity.” See F. Walsh, Strengthening Family Resilience, New York: The Guilford Press, 2016, p.14.
[Husband] Yes, there are always mixed opinions about that\(^{20}\).

The above mentioned cases clearly show their concerns of their own family members’ right to privacy, and hesitation in trusting others whom they do not have personal relationship with. The issue of “trust” is further underlined when the JSDF families, especially their wives, are not aware of the GSDF family support system is under development in collaboration with the SDF Family Association and SDF Veterans Association. Therefore, it remains a challenging task for GSDF to establish effective formal system of family support by organizing efforts of those SDF-related associations.

However, there are some continued efforts in order to improve effectiveness of the formal family support systems. For example, in Hokkaido and other local areas, some GSDF units conduct joint-exercises with those SDF-related associations in preparation for a large-scale natural disaster. Learning lessons from those practical field –exercises, the SDF Family Association continuously update the Guideline for Family Support Cooperation\(^{21}\). Listening to the voices calling for further improvement, the formal family support systems provided by SDF and SDF-related associations seem to have developed more effectively. Nonetheless, the SDF Family Association itself is suffering from overall trend of decreasing social capital in contemporary Japan. In the past few years, while 14,000 to 15,000 new recruits joined the SDF, less than 30% of the new recruits’ families joined the SDF Family Association, and in some Central Army areas, the percentage was 0-19% in 2018\(^{22}\). Institutional family support system is still struggling to establish effective voluntary service.

\(^{20}\) Interview #45.

\(^{21}\) The Guideline for Family Support Cooperation was first published in 2017, and has been updated annually. Over 9000 copies were distributed to the local groups of the Association. Contents of the Guideline include frameworks of family support cooperation in peace time and in time of disaster, how to organize the local support system and networks effectively, how to make safety check systems, how to make a map for assigning individual volunteers to the GSDF families in need of help, how to keep name list of the GSDF families while protecting private information and respecting their right to privacy, how to set up family support cooperation command and liaison office in the area of family support operation. <http://jkazokukai.or.jp/250-Kazokusien/Tebiki.pdf> accessed on March 9, 2020.

\(^{22}\) According to the statistics of membership recruitment for SDF Family Association in 2018, Hyogo 19%, Kyoto 16%, Osaka 12%, Nara 9%, Wakayama 0%. In contrast, the highest new membership areas are in Kyushu: Kagoshima 82%, Saga 69%, Nagasaki 55%. http://www.jkazokukai.or.jp/600-Koukai/H31-jigyou-keikaku.pdf
GENDER POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE OF FAMILY STRUCTURE

In the last two decades, gender policy in Japan has developed significantly. In 1999, recognizing the political importance of “gender equality”, Basic Act for Gender Equal Society went into effect. The law in particular emphasizes the equal roles of both men and women in family life as follows:

Compatibility of Activities in Family Life and Other Activities

Article 6 Formation of Gender Equal Society shall be undertaken with the aim for men and women who are members of families to be able to smoothly perform their roles as household members with regard to taking care of children and other family members and other activities in their home lives, through mutual cooperation and with social support, and for them to also be able to engage in activities other than these.

The rationale behind the law includes structural change of labor force and family style in Japan. The increasing number of women who joined the labor force in the 1980’s and 1990’s, and the previously predominant type of “Employed Husband and Housewife” has been replaced by the “Employed Couple”, or double-income family type, since late 1990’s.

However, the policy development focusing on “gender mainstreaming” has spurred only in the last few years in Japan. Although the UNSCR1325 was adopted in 2000, it was only in 2015 when the Japanese government established the National Action Plan for implementing the gender mainstreaming stipulated in UNSCR1325. In 2016, the Promotion of Women in Workplace Act took effect, and Ministry of Defense issued JSDF

---

23 The law intended “to respond to the rapid changes occurring in Japan's socioeconomic situations, such as the trend toward fewer children, the aging of the population, and the maturation of domestic economic activities, it has become a matter of urgent importance to realize Gender Equal society in which men and women respect each other's human rights and share responsibilities, and every citizen is able to fully display their individuality and ability regardless of gender. In this context, it is vital that the realization of Gender Equal society is positioned as the most important issue in determining the framework of 21stcentury Japan and those policies on the promotion of the Formation of Gender Equal Society are implemented in all fields.” Basic Act for Gender Equal Society, Act No. 78 of June 23, 1999 http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ law/detail_main?re=02&vrm=04&id=2526

24 Ibid.

Female Personnel Empowerment Initiative in April, 2017. This 2017 Initiative provides current guidelines for gender policies in the JSDF. While the Initiative emphasizes the value of promoting more active roles of women in the JSDF, it also clarifies human resource management policy for women focusing on improved work-life balance, in order to make the JSDF more attractive workplace and committed to gender equality. The Initiative also aims at increasing the percentage of female JSDF personnel, and opens virtually all positions in the JSDF to women.

Given that the majority of the families is the “double-income” type, and the husbands of the SDF female personnel are also most likely working for SDF, it is quite important to ensure family support for the SDF families not only in case of a large-scale natural disaster and other emergency situation, but also in everyday life situation. Although the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023), issued in December 2018, underlined the importance of “family support” measures, as well as “improving living and work environment” and “promoting work style reforms” in order to further increase the proportion of female SDF personnel, it remains to be seen how effectively these policies are implemented.

CONCLUSION

In the sections above, we examined the quantitative and qualitative data regarding the following research questions: 1) Is "Community Capacity Model" applicable to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) families?; 2) To what extent is "community capacity" developed? Is it functioning effectively? Are there any regional differences?; and 3) GSDF family support programs: How well are they working at the local level? Are there any regional differences?

Our findings suggest that a “community capacity” surrounding the JSDF families is not yet fully developed. In particular, the GSDF families live in some areas are witnessing eroding “sense of community.” Thereby, “Community Capacity Model” cannot be

---


applied to the GSDF families. Instead, alternative model of “Self-Efficacy,” or “Family Resilience,” should be considered as a more relevant model to explain the case of the JSDF families. Although there are some perceived needs, and the formal GSDF family support system is currently under development, the GSDF families trust their own family members and relatives by far, compared to others in neighborhood or those who belong to SDF-related associations.

Nonetheless, as recognized in the Medium Term Defense Program in 2018, the issue of “improving living and work environment” while institutionalizing effective family support systems for SDF personnel remains to be one of the most challenging but significant task for SDF in an age of gender mainstreaming and work style reform. In essence, improving quality of life and well-being of SDF personnel and their families result in higher level of unit readiness, morale, and retention.

---

SEMINAR PROGRAM

Military and Society in Israel and Japan
—Family Support, Mental Health and Public Support—
October 5, 2018

At the Conference Room No. 2, the HQ Building of National Defense Academy,
1-10-20 Hashirimizu, Yokosuka, Kanagawa 2398686 JAPAN

1310
Opening Remarks (Kawano)

1315-1345
Micky Aharonson: The Strategic Position of Israel

1345-1415
Eitan Shamir: IDF Doctrine and Force Development

1415-1445
Yagil Levy: Casualties and Israeli Society

1445-1500
Coffee Break

1500-1530
Eyal Ben-Ari: The Uses of Psychology and the IDF

1530-1620
Ofra Ben-Ishai: The IDF Behavioral Sciences Department

1620-1640
Hitoshi Kawano: Family Support and Gender Policy in the JSDF

1640-1705
Q&A and Discussion

1705-1710
Closing Remarks (Kawano)
**Micky Ahronson** is an expert in international relations at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. She was head of the foreign relations directorate of the National Security Council in the Prime Minister’s Office (2006-2014).

**Eitan Shamir** is a senior Lecturer at the Political Science Department, Bar Ilan University, and a Senior Research Associate with the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA Center).


**Eyal Ben-Ari** is Senior Research Fellow and Director, The Kinneret Center on Peace, Security and Society in Memory of Dan Shomron, Kinneret College on the Sea of Galilee. He was Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Head of Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,

**Ofra Ben Ishai** is Colonel (res.), IDF, and researcher at the Open University of Israel. She was the Head of the Human Behavioral Science Dept. (MAMDA), IDF, and the Chief Instructor of the Israeli National Defense College (INDC), IDF.

**Hitoshi Kawano** is Professor of Sociology at Department of Public Policy, and Director of Center for International Exchange, National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan. He was Special Coordinator, Human Resources Development Division, Bureau of Personnel & Education, Ministry of Defense (2011-2013).
GLOBAL SECURITY SEMINAR SERIES

*Global Security Seminar Series* is published occasionally by the Center for Global Security. The Center designs series of international seminars and other independent seminars. This series consists of the working papers of these seminars. The views expressed in this publication are solely of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions or governments of the authors.